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During the reign of Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735), the emperor initiated a radical 
frontier policy to consolidate and transform Yunnan, the province located in the far 
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transformation. Although the tensions between the two groups were visible, they 
accommodated, acculturated, and influenced each other in constructing a new social 
order in Yunnan. 
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“The mountains are high and the emperor is far away (山高皇帝遠).” This 
popular Chinese proverb declares that the emperor is as distant and far away as the sky, 
and so one may do what one pleases. It accurately summarizes the relationship between 
China’s imperial administration and its southwestern province of Yunnan from the 
perspective of Yunnan’s population. Its location in the far southwest of China and 
adjacent to the Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Burma confines 
Yunnan’s interaction with the populated areas in the rest of China. Yunnan’s historical 
isolation meant that the central governments’ engagement remained limited, shaping 
Yunnan’s image to be one of regions largely “untouched” and shrouded in mystery to 
outsiders.  
Descriptions of Yunnan as a remote region were shaped in large part by the 
substantial physical distance from Beijing, the cultural and political center of the Qing 
empire. The picture of the region’s indigenous population was shaped by a perception of 
cultural superiority that viewed the Han majority as the superior civilization. This image 
held sway as early as Western Han dynasty (206 BCE- 8 CE). The historian Sima Qian 
(c.145-86 BCE司馬遷) called the indigenous populations in the southwest (Sichuan, 
Guizhou and Yunnan) “Southwestern Barbarians” (西南夷). This description of Yunnan 
places the Han Chinese population at the center of Yunnan’s story, displacing its native 
residents in the process. In this view, uncivilized barbarians should be pacified, 
transformed, and ultimately assimilated, in a process that historian Mary Wright has 
2 
termed “Sinicization.”1 The term “Sinicization” refers to the process of assimilation and 
absorption of non-Han populations into the influence-sphere of Chinese culture. Through 
acknowledging Han superiority, historian John Herman argues that the goal of 
consolidating the empire southwest could be achieved by imposing Han Chinese cultural 
institutions upon indigenous communities and Sinicizing their respective cultures.2 This 
definition stresses the necessity of civilizing non-Han populations through exposing them 
to Chinese customs, traditions and patterns of life. At the same time, it states that ethnic 
minorities were excluded from being recognized as ‘civilized’ until those minorities were 
integrated into the Chinese cultural sphere. 
The Sinicization theory is discussed about the success of the Qing empire, which 
was established and dominated by the Manchus. Ping-ti Ho argues that the key for the 
Qing Manchus to achieve such enormous success—in territorial expansion, a flourishing 
economy, and an unprecedented productivity and refinement in literature and material 
culture—was the adoption of a “policy of systematic sinicization.”3 Ho lists a trenchant 
example to show how the early Manchu rulers used systematic sinicization, including the 
adoption of the Ming government system with few Manchu innovations, and the 
utilization of Confucian orthodox principles in the education curriculum and in the 
legitimization of Manchu rule. Ho’s conviction of the importance of Sinicization ignores 
the fact that the Qing emperors did not fail to preserve Manchu customs and traditions. 
1 Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-
1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957). Wright calls the Qing dynasty as “conquest 
dynasty.” She believes that the key to success as a conquest dynasty was the adoption of Chinese 
ideology and bureaucratic system.  
2 John E. Herman, “Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain 
System,” The Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 1 (Feb 1997): 69. 
3 Ho Ping-ti, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian 
Studies 26, No.2 (1967):191. 
3 
Hunting expeditions and traditional wrestling were Manchu traditions that had never been 
replaced by Chinese traditions. In addition, all male subjects of the Qing dynasty were 
required to shave their forehead and wear the queue4, a hairstyle which had only been 
worn by the Manchu men in the early Qing dynasty until Han-Chinese men were forced 
to adopt it in order to show their compliance to Manchu policy. The queue became a 
symbol of Manchu identity as well as of the subjugation of Han men.  
After a short-lived ethnic segregation, the Qing dynasty showed reliance on 
interethnic marriage to enhance Manchu-Han and Manchu-Mongol alliances and reduce 
tensions between the Manchu and other groups. But Ho argues that the interethnic 
marriage throughout the Qing period caused the Manchu men, especially those from the 
banner system, to suffer from “progressive impoverish” of their own traditions because of 
their extended mingling with the Han Chinese.5 The embracement of Chinese culture and 
language caused the Manchu language to be reduced to a mere dialect in the nineteenth 
century. Therefore, Ho believes that the so-called alien dynasty sacrificed Manchu 
identity and tradition in the process of assimilation into Chinese identity in exchange for 
enjoying a phase of “peace, prosperity, and contentment.”6 When the Manchus entered 
Beijing, they consented to a certain level of assimilation as the only choice to 
successfully govern the Han. David Honey does not claim that the Manchus took the 
initiative to embrace Confucianism, he argues that Sinicization as an unconscious cultural 
4 The queue hairstyle required that men shaved the front of their head and braided the remaining 
hair at the back of their head into a single queue. 
5 Ho, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period,” 192. 
6 Ho, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period,” 193; Urandyn E. Bulag, “Twentieth-Century 
China: Ethnic Assimilation and Intergroup Violence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide 
Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 429. 
4 
process transformed the conquest ruling classes in China.7 This perspective is linked to 
the emphasis of Han supremacy, distinguishing the ethnic characteristics including 
language, custom, religion, and lifestyle.8 By doing so, the Manchu lost their uniqueness 
and became merely the ruling class of the sinicized Qing dynasty. 
Ho’s sinicization thesis has been challenged by Evelyn Rawski and Mark Elliott, 
who have been associated with the New Qing History.9 Rawski agrees with Ho that the 
Qing was the most successful conquest dynasty in Chinese history, but she argues that the 
key to the Qing success in empire building was the ability to use cultural links to connect 
with the non-Han peoples of Inner Asia and to differentiate in the administration between 
the non-Han regions and the former Ming provinces.10 Rawski admits that Confucianism 
was universally applicable but insists that the core of the Qing policy was based on the 
submission of divergent groups who had been part of independent cultures.11 In this 
sense, the research should concentrate on the ability of the Manchus to consolidate 
multiethnic groups from a variety of cultural backgrounds. 
Rawski interprets the sinicization theory as “a twentieth-century Han nationalist 
interpretation of China’s past” after Sun Yat-sen declared the Confucian doctrine had 
7 David Honey, “Sinification as Statecraft in Conquest Dynasties of China: Two Early Medieval 
Case Studies,” Journal of Asian History 30, no.2 (1996), 116. 
8 Chih-yu Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship as a Response to the State (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002),101. Shih calls this perspective the ‘Han perspective’, 
indicating that the Chinese consciousness would penetrate ethnic arenas. This social science 
paradigm dominates the mainstream historiography of China.  
9 Scholars of New Qing History have analyzed a broad range of Manchu-language documents and 
archival materials, which had been largely ignored by scholars who focused on the Sinicization of 
the Manchu Qing rulers. 
10 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the 
Qing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no.4 (1996): 831. 
11 Rawski, “Presidential Address,” 835. 
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defined Chinese identity on cultural grounds and had served to educate diverse people.12 
In his “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s Reenvisioning the 
Qing,” Ho attacks Rawski’s analysis of the success of the Qing empire fails to explain 
how multiethnic measures of the Qing regime facilitated the Manchu government to be 
cast in a Han model. Ho contributes Rawski’s limitation to the lack of considering how 
the Qing ruled China by means of Confucian principles and institutions. Ho insists that 
Sinicization went far beyond the narrow confines of interethnic relations, but instead was 
a continuous process and that any diachronic study of Sinicization must end with a 
hypothesis of its future.13 
Mark Elliott participated in the debate of the Sinicization theory with a measured 
response. In his Altaic School, Elliot emphasizes that “Manchuness” was as important as 
“Chineseness” in the resolution of the minority-rule question that downplayed the 
dynasty’s ethnic “otherness.”14 Elliott stresses the Manchu ability to adapt to Chinese 
political traditions while maintaining a separate identity as the first mode of Qing rule. 
He identifies their second mode of ruling as legitimating authority which he labels 
“ethnic sovereignty.” Ethnic sovereignty is articulated in three categories: the special 
position of the Manchu emperors at the apex of their multiethnic empire; their process of 
instilling fear in the Han; and the preservation of the integrity of Manchu culture.15 While 
the Manchu lost part of their cultural integrity along their adoption of “Chinese ways,” 
Elliott suggests that the term like Sinicization is insufficient in capturing the unique traits 
12 Rawski, “Presidential Address,” 842. 
13 Ho Ping-ti, “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s Reenvisioning the 
Qing,” The Journal of Asian Studies 57, no.1 (1998): 151-2. 
14 Mark C. Elliott. The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial 
China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press (2001),28, 31. 
15 Elliott, The Manchu Way,6. 
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of Qing rule, and therefore, the term needs to be used in a constructive and cautious way. 
The concern of the Sinicization framework evokes is its failure to see the historical 
contributions of non-Han peoples to the construction of the multiethnic Qing empire.  
Yet the Sinicization theory is not the only limitation in the study of Yunnan. In 
the imperial era (221 BCE-1912 CE), the perception of Yunnan as ‘frontier’ was defined 
by the physical distance; in modern and contemporary China (1949-the present day), the 
lack of economic prosperity and governmental strategies define Yunnan as an inferior 
frontier. The connotation of backwardness (luohou落後) is applied in the discussion of 
the frontier, used especially for the areas of national minorities (shaoshu minzu少數民
族).16 General-Secretary Jiang Zemin proposed the Great Western Development Strategy 
(西部大開發) in 1999, identifying Yunnan as China’s western frontier on account of its 
comparatively underdeveloped economy. Influenced by this political agenda, different, 
and even contrasting meanings of frontier (bianjiang 邊疆) are applied. Scholars have 
highlighted backwardness and a culturally isolation when describing Yunnan as a frontier 
region. Chinese scholars use the term bianjiang to express and locate ‘borderland’ and 
‘frontier.’ Such an approach in the study of Yunnan is problematic; for example, 
contemporary studies of Yunnan’s ethnic groups and the Ming and Qing governance in 
frontier areas largely concentrate on how the central government’s policies were 
informed by the conceptualization of the frontier region and the respective political needs 
of the empire.17 It reflects that the imperial administrations simply considered the 
 
16 Po-Yi Hung. Tea Production, Land Use Politics, and Ethnic Minorities: Struggling over 
Dilemmas in China’s Southwest Frontier (New York, NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2015), 10. 
17 Qian Bingyi 錢秉益, Ming-Qing shiqi dui Yunnan minzu renzhi de yanjin yu bianjiang zhili 明
清時期對雲南民族認知的演進與邊疆治理 (A Study of the Cognitive Evolution of Yunnan’s 
7 
borderlands as part of the territory meeting political interests and ignored the 
complexities of native communities.  
The discussions mentioned above related to the frontier framework. Scholars have 
applied the historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s ‘frontier’ thesis to define Yunnan as a 
frontier region, although Turner never wrote about China. In the geographic imagination, 
writes Turner, the frontier was a space peripheral to a nation’s core and a “meeting point 
between savagery and civilization.”18 Turner’s frontier thesis argues that American 
democracy was forged on the American frontier. Anti-Turnerians like Patricia Nelson 
Limerick challenge the limitation and the validity of ‘frontier’ by questioning its 
significance for American democratic institutions. Instead, Patricia Limerick believes that 
the frontier was a “place” and not a “process” because Indian Americans, Latin 
Americans, Anglo-Americans, and Asian Americans intersected and jointly constitute the 
diversity of languages, religions, and cultures in the US West.19 In the conquest of the 
West, European immigrants and American natives engaged in property and profit 
allocation, entangling ethnic diversity with economic competition and cultural dominance 
in Western history. Considering the West as a “place” with all these factors, says 
Limerick, gives Western America its own, intrinsic historical significance.20  
Limerick’s innovative approach to deemphasize the ‘frontier’ offers a new 
intellectual paradigm. Turner’s ‘frontier’ was a process in which ‘civilization’ conquered 
‘savagery.’ In the conquest, if not yet in transforming and assimilating, the frontier had 
Ethnic Groups in Ming and Qing Dynasties and the Governance of Frontier Areas in 
Southwestern China) (China: Social Sciences and Academic Press, 2019), 1-31. 
18 Frederick J. Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, 1921), 60. 
19 Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West 
(New York, Norton, 1987), 27. 
20 Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, 30. 
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always been inferior to the federal administration and to the East. It was a one-sided 
viewpoint because it obscured our—historians’ and later generations’—visions to see 
how the Natives saw and responded to the westward expansion. It also denied the 
barbaric culture as a persistent pattern of civilization. By adopting the term ‘frontier’ and 
Turner’s frontier thesis, one could easily forget the diversity and complexity of Western 
history. Turner’s frontier thesis proved its limitation to the new scholarship in US history, 
but his frontier hypothesis has been widely discussed in Chinese frontier histories. Some 
historians build a new interpretation of the Yunnan frontier upon his thesis, while some 
replace the term ‘frontier’ with the term ‘borderland.’ 
In his Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier, 
historian Charles Patterson Giersch focuses on the intersections of imperial conquest, 
Han migration, and cultural encounters in China’s southwest frontier. He admits that 
Turner’s definition of ‘frontier’ resonates with the practices of Qing officials, who 
considered the Yunnan border region as a place where “imperial ethics and control 
competed with barbarian immorality and chaos.”21 Rather than praising the achievements 
of civilization, Giersch describes the Qing expansion as the Han majority’s invasion of 
the indigenous communities. He rejects the concept ‘frontier’ because it centers the role 
of the Han majority in transforming indigenous populations and reinforces the myth of 
Han superiority. Giersch labels Yunnan as a “middle ground” as well as a “borderlands” 
region from which the Qing, Burmese, Siamese, and in some cases, Vietnamese exported 
complex sets of religious beliefs and lifeways to increase their control over the region.  
 
21 Charles Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Frontier 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) 3. 
9 
Another scholar Po-Yi Hung who focuses on the cross-regional tea trade and 
changes in China’s southwest frontier environment, does not address Yunnan as a 
meeting ground. In a case study of the pu’er tea trade, Hung argues that frontiers are 
dilemmas as well as meeting points of inclusive and exclusive powers, center and 
periphery, modernity and primitivity.22 Hung summarizes these binaries as the “core-
periphery division” that was constructed from the core of power. According to Hung, the 
frontier region was included in the state’s consideration only if the government aimed to 
mitigate the gap of development between the core and the periphery.23 He elaborates this 
argument in the Qing expansion to Yunnan, denoting that the Qing empire not only 
aimed to consolidate the southwestern provinces but also wished to balance the 
development between Yunnan and other areas, especially the southeastern coastal cities. 
Therefore, Hung takes the frontier to be a relational space with respect to a diverse 
national background rather than a general geographical location.24 
Giersch and Hung both recognize the complexity of society and culture in the 
frontier regions and challenge the limitation of the established frontier concept. Present-
day scholars expand the discussion with the inclusion of ‘borderlands.’ The concepts of 
‘frontier’ and ‘borderland’ rely upon a comparison between a ‘civilized’ and an ‘savage’ 
society, but not all scholars pay enough attention to the differences between them.  
Giersch makes such distinction. His rejection of the ‘frontier’ thesis leads to the 
usage of two terminologies: ‘middle ground’ and ‘borderland.’ Giersch defines that 
borderlands as regions without clearly defined political boundaries where multiple 
22 Hung, Tea Production, 7-10. 
23 Hung, Tea Production, 9. 
24 Hung, Tea Production, 8. 
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powers competed for resources and indigenous allies.25 Yunnan was a borderland because 
the Qing claimed the control over the indigenous territory within the province that never 
had a clear political boundary between the nation’s periphery and the nation’s core. In his 
environmental history of the Qing empire and its borderlands, David Anthony Bello 
applies the “central-local dichotomy” when defining borderland spaces as those that lied 
beyond the influence of the empire’s core and that experienced less spatial and social 
centralization.26 Bello’s definition emphasizes the differences in power and social order 
between the empire’s core and margins. This approach focuses on how the physical 
distance and natural landscape shaped Qing rule in southwest China, but it falls into the 
trap of Turner’s frontier thesis that denies the barbaric culture as a pattern of civilization. 
None of the scholars of early modern Chinese history constructs a systematic 
framework for ‘borderland’, but Western historiography provide essential components 
that can explain China’s southwest. Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel take a 
similar approach to Yunnan as Giersch who challenge the conventional state-centered 
history. Baud and Van Schendel emphasize how “border-making” shaped and 
transformed borderland livelihoods and how native tribes and racial groups narrated their 
histories. In their description, the creation of borders indeed presented the scene for new 
power relations in the borderland, allowing different social groups to confront and impact 
each other.27 Three major groups participated in the history of borderland: state, regional 
(native) elites, and local population.  
 
25 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 3-5.  
26 David Anthony Bello, Across Forest, Steppe and Mountain: Environment, Identity and Empire 
in Qing China’s Borderlands: Studies in Environment and History (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 12. 
27 Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel, “Towards a Comparative Approach to Borderlands,” 
Journal of World History 8, no.2 (1997): 220. 
11 
During the conquest of a borderland, three social groups engaged in and 
responded to the power transition in three principal patterns. The response can be quiet, 
unruly, or rebellious which reveals the changing power relations between state, regional 
ruling class, and local community in the borderlands. According to these patterns, 
Yunnan was not the quiet borderland that experienced a peaceful and coherent power 
transfer, because the local resistance consistently challenged the imperial authority. 
Yunnan was the unruly and rebellious borderland, especially barbaric rebels massacred 
priests in temples and provoked the Qing troops stationed in the Simao region after 
Yongzheng had proposed a military plan to colonialize Yunnan. Those unruly and 
barbaric rebels posted real threats to the Qing expansion, boosting the advocation for the 
deployment of the military to stabilize the southwest and pacify native populations.  
The analysis above was generated from the perspective of the history of China. 
Scholars of Southeast Asian Studies have a better understanding of Yunnan because of 
the shorter geographic distance to its neighboring states. Instead of distinguishing 
borderlands from frontiers, Wen-Chin Chang associates the concept of “borderland” with 
more visible characteristics: periphery, wasteland, backwardness, and lawlessness.28 
Similar to Giersch, Chang takes a trans-border and transnational perspective to narrate 
the stories of Yunnanese migrants of Burma. Chang’s immediate concern is not 
borderland study itself. Rather, she places indigenous agency at the center of her 
exploration of how marginal people, migrants, the natural landscape, and trade 
opportunities in Yunnan can illuminate the dynamics of the periphery.29  
28 Wen-Chin Chang, Beyond Borders: Stories of Yunnanese Chinese Migrants of Burma (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 12. 
29 Chang, Beyond Borders, 13. 
12 
Both the frontier and borderland frameworks can help address certain aspects of 
Yunnan’s history, but the weakness of the ‘frontier’ concept lies in overemphasizing a 
single perspective. Scholars who borrow the concept of frontier easily fall into the trap of 
centering the roles of Han settlers and the Han majority in the histories of ethnic 
minorities. In my thesis, I refer Yunnan as the frontier because to indigenous groups at 
the time of the Qing expansion, bianjiang was an expression of locating their distance 
from the central government rather than a negative expression that distinguished them 
from the Han majority and discriminated against native populations.30 My research of 
Yunnan concentrates on analyzing the province as ‘borderland’ because of three focal 
points deemed essential: a distinctive natural environment and ethnic diversity, core-
periphery division, and competition for natural resources. In short, Yunnan was a 
borderland where the geographic distance limited the reach of the central power, but 
geographic conditions nourished ethnic diversity, and natural resources attracted 
competition between the Qing empire and neighboring states. 
The central argument of this study is that Yunnan was not a meeting point where 
the Han majority transformed the non-Han minority and thus designed the frontier. 
Instead, this study focuses on the roles of Qing institutions and Han immigrants, native 
rulers, and local settlers alike in mutually adopting and exerting influences in the process 
of building a new social order in Yunnan. By situating Yunnan at the center of my thesis, 
I explore how Han settlers and Natives profoundly influenced one another, provoking 
30 Limerick in her book The Legacy of the Conquest raises the same claim. She says, if we rethink 
the West a place, Natives who occupied many complicated environments considered their 
habitats to be at the center, not the edge. See page 26. 
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significant transformations in the wake of Yongzheng’s “new frontier militarism.”31 As 
multiple expansive powers competed for resources and allies in the frontier region, 
environmental historian Jonathan Schlesinger says we must evaluate the encounters 
between Han Chinese and indigenous people across the frontier because there is more to 
Chinese history than a story about China.32 To accomplish this goal, we must avoid the 
confining theory of Sinicization, which places the role of Han immigrants in building the 
frontier societies at the center. We have to reconsider the role of indigenous people in the 
history of the empire’s southwest because their voices revealed important aspects of the 
history of the multicultural society they helped to build.  
To achieve this goal, my thesis utilizes a broad array of sources, ranging from 
imperial records of memorials and emperor’s edicts to Qing officials’ descriptions of 
Yunnan in local gazetteers. To fully understand how Yongzheng’s officials transformed 
and governed Yunnan, I survey the Historical Gazetteer of Yunnan (雲南通志) by 
E’ertai, who was one of the most trusted of Yongzheng’s officials and who himself 
initiated a radical frontier policy to expand imperial control over Yunnan. His work 
captured how different imperial dynasties ruled Yunnan in accordance with the Qing 
empire’s institutional systems. By contrast, Chen Hongmou who was a Chinese official, 
scholar, and philosopher, did not radically discriminate against the ‘barbarians’ and their 
‘savage’ customs. His attitude towards education and indigenous peoples has been 
31 Giersch, Asian Borderlands,43. Giersch names the 1720s and 1730s as a time of aggressive 
Qing expansion throughout the southwest under the policy of Yongzheng’s “new frontier 
militarism.” 
32 Jonathan Schlesinger, A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the 
Natural Fringe of Qing (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017), 3. 
14 
recorded in The Regulations for Education and Political Career (Xueshi Yigui學仕遺
規).  
The thesis begins with examining the ways in which geography shaped Yunnan’s 
relation to the imperial dynasties. The region’s abundant natural resources and strategic 
positions had always inspired ambitious invaders from the Central Plain to subjugate 
Yunnan with its diverse non-Han population. It was not until the Mongol conquest in 
1273 that Yunnan was incorporated as a province of the territory of China. The following 
dynasties—the Ming and the Qing—built upon the Yuan dynasty to colonialize the 
southwest and incorporate Yunnan as a permanent province of China. Chapter two 
concentrates on the Qing expansion throughout Yunnan during the Yongzheng era. Qing 
officials initiated a series of policies to secure salt revenues and replace native officials 
with Qing-appointed officials. To discuss the Qing expansion, I have relied on memorials 
by Yongzheng’s officials: Gao Qizhuo, Li Wei, E’ertai, and Chen Hongmou. Their 
frontier reforms not only reinforced the regime’s control over Yunnan, but also inspired 
Chinese immigrants who later became the population majority of the province to exploit 
resources and trade opportunities. Chapter three explores the legacy of Han immigration 
whose advanced agricultural technology caused the population to increase and gave rise 
to cities. Han settlers’ engagement in the local economy greatly forged a new urban 
culture. In the nineteenth century, the exploitation of Yunnan’s copper mines and the 
caravan trade connected the Qing empire to Southeast Asia, which signified the 
integration of regional trade into transregional trade. By exploring the contribution of the 
Qing regime, native officials, and local settlers in transforming Yunnan, the thesis 
concludes that Yunnan was less a meeting ground between savagery and civilization than 
15 
a region in which Han civilization and ethnic communities intersected, accommodated, 




MAPPING YUNNAN AND ITS REGIONAL LANDSCAPE 
 
In the study of imperial Chinese history, southwest China and its residents were 
comparatively marginalized. Although both the coastal southeast and the inland 
southwest were distant from the imperial capital and the administrative centers in the 
interior of China, it was only the southwest that was continuously labeled “peripheral” by 
the Chinese state since the first encounters in the Qin dynasty.33 This was because the 
southeastern regions practiced state-oriented rituals and cultural practices and recognized 
the legitimacy of Chinese imperial rulers, both factors that counted as signs of 
subjugation to the Chinese centralized government. By contrast, the southwestern 
populations inherited different native cultural practices that Confucianism never replaced. 
More importantly, the southwest was not governed by state-appointed officials and 
institutions until the Ming regime directly governed the region of China.  
At times indigenes’ conflicts and disputes with Burma34 prompted Chinese 
imperial rulers to dispatch military forces to conquer and to stabilize the southwest. That 
region’s distinctive geographic, political, and cultural characteristics were nearly 
incomprehensible to the empire’s Han majority. This misunderstanding was the product 
of the concept that Chinese civilization was superior. Once Confucianism became 
 
33 David Faure and Ho Ts’ui-p’ing, Chieftains into Ancestors: Imperial Expansion and 
Indigenous Society in Southwest China (Vancouver, Toronto: UBC Press, 2013), 19. 
34 The ruling military junta changed the English name from “Burma” to “Myanmar” in 1989. 
Currently Myanmar’s official name in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. I will still use the 
term Burma because my research concentrates on the period before the nineteenth century. 
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dominant in China during the Han dynasty, notions of hierarchy and benevolence 
constructed the social order of Chinese civilization. The Confucians believed that the 
selected Son of Heaven ruled on earth with the Mandate of Heaven. Those chosen for the 
throne should be strengthened by forming a “concentric hierarchy.”35 Confucianism 
defined the essential components for being a civilized Chinese and drew a distinction 
between civilized Han Chinese (hua華) and the barbarians (yi夷). Over the centuries, 
peoples of the borderlands had been conceived and described as wild, uncultured humans 
who lived in backward societies and used primitive agricultural technologies. The 
assumption of Sinocentrism naturally portrayed that Chinese civilization had the power to 
unify and transform the native population.36  
Not surprisingly, the contemporary research of Chinese “minority histories” is not 
a part of the mainstream of research about Chinese history and has no overt political 
agenda. Two interesting features define the expression “minority histories.” First, the 
concepts of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ are problematic because they are not solely 
determined by the statistics of each group. Instead, the idea of majority is made on the 
basis of a presumption of homogeneity while the notion of minority is designed to mark 
differences.37 With regard to Yunnan, the Han Chinese were—and still are—the 
statistical majority. Their presence transformed the original cultural values of the 
indigenous communities and gradually dominated mainstream culture and political power 
in the empire and China’s periphery. In the process of replacing non-Han Chinese culture 
 
35 Yuan-Kang Wang, “Explaining the Tribute System: Power, Confucianism, and War in 
Medieval East Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no.2 (2013): 211-3.  
36 Leo K. Shin. The Making of Chinese States: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-2. 
37 Shin, The Making of the Chinese State, 6. 
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with Chinese civilization, Han majority and non-Han minority encountered each other. 
As such, concludes Shin, the two categories—both the minority and majority—and the 
people they represent are interdependent.38  
Second, the idea of Han superiority is promoted by political campaigns, 
propagating Chinese national unity formulated in the Ethnic Classification Project of 
1954 that bonded both Han Chinese and ethnic minorities across the nation. The Mao-
built Communist government recognized that the effective control over China’s 
minorities required the identification of representative ethnic groups in the multiethnic 
territories and the provision to all citizens the same status enjoyed by the nation’s ethnic 
Han majority (各民族平等).39 Accordingly, building a centralized education system and 
fostering Putonghua (普通話) or Standard Chinese (Mandarin) as the national language 
in the ethnic borderlands became effective ways to consolidate national identity.  
But practically, the history of the frontier has excluded remote regions and its 
ethnic minorities from the major narratives in the history of China. On account of the 
concepts of majority and minority and the equality of Han and non-Han, majorities and 
minorities play equal importance in the narrative of China’s frontier expansion. A more 
succinct understanding of the southwest requires not merely concentrating on 
geographical, cultural, and political specifics of the southwestern frontier. It also requires 
an analysis of the southwest from a transregional perspective, taking into consideration 
perspectives of Southeast Asia beginning with the shadows of the Mongol conquest and 
following Southeast Asian involvement until the end of Manchu rule. 
 
38 Ibid, 6. 
39 Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi, The Han: China’s Diverse Majority (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2015), 38. 
 19 
 The history of Yunnan’s encounter with the imperial state and with foreign 
cultures, and the resulting transformations, topography and geography jointly shaped 
Yunnan’s relation to the imperial dynasties. By presenting an overview of the Yunnan 
landscape, this chapter explores the dynamic course of historical change along with the 
centralized rule’s incrementally expansion to the region and the invention of the term 
“Yunnan” to govern the local population and their land.  
Mapping Yunnan 
From ancient times to the present, the geographical description of Yunnan has 
been inseparable from the following key words: situated in the far southwest and 
bordering with the Southeast Asian countries. Yunnan is situated on the Yunnan-Guizhou 
Plateau, the southern extension of the roof of the world, the so-called Tibetan Plateau. 
Mountains, rivers, gorges, plateaus, valleys, basins, forests, grasslands, and lakes 
encompass a wide variety of environmental conditions in Yunnan. In the Historical 
Gazetteer of Yunnan, E’ertai describes that Dian (滇)40 was located in the empire’s 
frontier that: 
…faces Fannan (蕃南) in the north and is adjacent to Burma in the west. [The 
region] is adjacent to foreign states, and it only borders with Guizhou, Sichuan, 
and Yue (in today’s autonomous region of Guangxi) in the northeast. Most 
inhabitants are aggressive barbarians. They also occupy the center of the region.41    
 
In this statement, E’ertai not only highlights Yunnan’s geographic location but also 
discriminately views indigenous peoples as inferior and barbaric. Despite its proximity to 
 
40 Dian(滇) is an official abbreviation of Yunnan. But Yang believes that Dian is more likely an 
indigenous word used as a name for themselves. Bin Yang, Between Wind and Clouds: The 
Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 34. 
41 YNTZ, juan 5. Fannan (蕃南)refers to south Xinjiang where is located in the south of the 
Tianshan. 
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long-held Chinese territory, Yunnan had closer ethnic and cultural ties to Southeast Asia. 
For example, in Xishuangbanna (西雙版納)—the extreme south of Yunnan province—its 
people, architectural styles, language, and religious practices closely resemble those of 
Thailand, Laos, and Burma.42 Theravada Buddhism, a Burmese export, influenced Dai 
(傣) political and religious ritual. Dai communities constructed Buddhist temples and 
other religious architecture with centers of diplomatic exchange in northern Burma and 
northern Thailand, such as Chiang Mai. In school, Yunnanese boys learned in their local 
Dai script rather than to write in Chinese characters; and the celebration of local festivals 
such as the Dai New Year in April is also celebrated in Burma and Thailand to the 
present day.43 This mixture of Southeast Asian cultural exports, tribal and indigenous 
cultural practices, and Chinese civilization is what made Yunnan unique. Yunnan’s 
historical location in the Sino-Southeast Asian borderland shaped the family metaphors 
that China became “father” and Burma became “mother.”44 
Yunnan’s topography was another factor that isolated the region from the core of 
the Chinese empire. Compared with other provinces, Yunnan’s mountainous landscape 
had little arable land. Agricultural production in Yunnan was centered in small fertile 
basins and valleys called bazi (垻子). Although bazi occupied only six percent of 
Yunnan’s territory, this land played a significant role in the region’s agricultural 
economy. Rivers nurtured flat terrain and fertile soil, making it suitable for planting and 
fostering the development of urban centers. For example, the Dianchi region around 
 
42 Xishuangbanna is well-known for its ethnic groups. The largest ethnic groups lived here were 
the Dai. Xishuangbanna is now an Autonomous Prefecture for Dai People.  
43 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 193-8. The Dai New Year is also known as the “Water Splashing 
Festival (潑水節).” 
44 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 87. 
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today’s provincial capital Kunming and the Erhai region, the location of the Nanzhao 
Kingdom in today’s Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, were the two largest bazi of 
Yunnan. Bazi facilitated the exchange of local and foreign products, providing food and 
housing for merchants engaged in cross-regional trade.45 Commerce in Yunnan benefited 
from the bazi which were situated throughout a range of altitudes in a variety of 
landscape and cultures. Bazi offered easily accessible farmland where the diverse ethnic 
groups, Han Chinese, and foreign merchants interacted, representing “the dynamic and 
diverse Yunnan society.”46 Bazi presented ideal and suitable land for settlement, 
agricultural productivity, commercial exchange, and human interaction, predominantly in 
low altitude regions of Yunnan. However, the significance of Bazi could not solve the 
shortage of arable land.  
In 1726,  Zhang Yunsui (1692-1751 張允隨) reported that “In Yunnan, arable 
land is less than the mountainous area. Between high and steep cliffs and barren and 
infertile lands, the cultivation of buckwheat, corn, cereal, barely, and barnyard grass is 
life-saving.”47 Agricultural cultivation was also dependent on the seasonal climate. In the 
summer, the land was parched by drought; in the winter, the rivers flooded, turning the 
ground into untillable sludge. The construction of irrigation systems was difficult—
together these factors prevented large-scale agricultural production. In his General 
History of Yunnan, E’ertai discusses different methods to prevent drought and mitigate 
 
45 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 25-26; Huang Fei, “Between Hills and Valleys: Contesting 
the Bazi Landscape, Society, and Environment in Southwestern China (1700-1900),” Journal of 
Asian History 51, no. 2 (2017): 258. 
46 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 26. 
47 Ni Tui 倪蛻, Dianyun Linian Zhuan 滇雲歷年傳 (Chronicle of Dian and Yun).Yunnan 
University Press, 2018, juan 12.  
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the danger of floods, including water diversion, water gates, and water storage facilities.48 
In regions other than the flood-prone lowlands, Yunnan’s mountainsides were exploited 
for sweet potato and corn cultivation.  
Different dynasties understood that Yunnan was occupied by indigenous peoples, 
but consideration of Yunnanese peoples as ethnic minorities is an invention of the mid-
twentieth century. Only after Mao Zedong declared the Han majority as “the core of the 
Chinese nation” and “the creator of a superior cultural tradition” did the Chinese state 
officially recognize fifty-five ethnic minority groups in addition to the Han majority.49 
Among China’s fifty-six recognized ethnic groups, twenty-five groups are found in 
Yunnan. It is unsurprising that the Qing empire did not even distinguish different ethnic 
groups with specific names. E’ertai defined natives by their customs: “Inhabitants in 
Yunnan do not practice rituals and Han principles in their daily customs. These 
barbarians live mixed among different ethnic groups, although their temper and customs 
are different.”50 Although describing indigenous peoples in general as ‘barbarians,’ the 
Qing rulers still relied upon geography to categorize Yunnanese peoples; for example, the 
inhabitants of Xishuangbanna were Dai people (傣人). However, this work’s use of 
specific ethnonyms is almost entirely informed by the ethnographic taxonomy composed 
from the first and second national census conducted in 1954 and in 1964 respectively.   
Understanding the geography topography, and ethnic distribution of Yunnan lays 
a solid foundation for examining livelihoods in the empire’s geographic and cultural 
periphery. Those who lived in regions where the imperial control could hardly reach, 
 
48  YNTZ, juan 13.  
49 Jonia-Lüthi. The Han,41-2. 
50YNTZ, juan 8. 
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were simultaneously excluded from Han China. China’s emperors valued the existence of 
Yunnan due to its strategic location, natural resources, and distinctive cultures, but 
indigenous people did not accept being Yunnanese until the imperial Chinese 
administration expanded Chinese institutions to Yunnan during the Yuan and Ming 
periods.51  
Governance Prior to the Mongol Conquest of 1273 
Different from provinces that were permanent parts of the Chinese territory, 
Yunnan was not fully incorporated into the Chinese empire until the conquest of the 
Mongols. Yunnan encountered the administrative institutions, new settlers, and foreign 
polities in the region through the Ming-Qing colonialization. Records of Yunnan can be 
found as early as the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE), at the time when Yunnan was called 
Dian (滇).The early Han dynasty historian Sima Qian in his Shi Ji (史記) reported about 
‘southwestern barbarians’, which referred to both, a physical boundary and an ethnic 
diaspora: 
There are more than dozens of tribes that live in the southwestern regions. The 
Yelang (夜郎 in today’s Guizhou) is the most powerful among the minor tribes. 
The Dian tribe is the most powerful among dozens of tribes in the western part of 
Yelang. Those indigenous barbarians tie hair into a braid, wander across 
thousands of miles, but have neither a permanent residence nor general leader.52 
This text describes the variety and distribution of “tribes” in the southwest, as well as 
their different customs and ways of life, but it leaves open whether and how the Qin 
empire governed its southwestern regions. The Qin dynasty paid attention to the 
southwest because of its strategic role in defeating the Chu Kingdom, a victory that had 
 
51 Yang, Between Wind and Clouds,10. 
52 Sima Qian 司馬遷. Shiji: Xinanyi lie zhuan 史记·西南夷列傳 (Records of the Grand Historian: 
The Southwestern Barbarians) vol. 116. 
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influenced the South (modern Guangdong), the East (the Yue kingdoms), and the West 
(the modern provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou). When Qin defeated the Shu 
Kingdom (in modern Sichuan Province) in 316 BCE the Qin army surrounded them on 
land and water marching through Sichuan, Kunming, Yelang, and Dian.53 After the First 
Emperor had unified all of China in 221 BCE, he placed governors in the southwest. One 
of the effective methods for governing the southwest and reinforcing the presence of the 
central administration on the periphery was to construct roads to connect the frontier 
regions with the Qin capital of Xianyang.54 It was Yunnan’s first encounter with the 
imperial state. 
 The collapse of the Qin in 207 BCE left behind chaos that lasted until Emperor 
Gaozu (r. 202-195 BCE) reunited China under the Han dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE). In 
122 BCE, Emperor Wu (r.141-87 BCE) sent envoys to scout pathways “from the Shu 
through India to Daxia (Bactria)” which worked as an alternative route to Central Asia; 
the envoys returned with reports about the existence of early commercial trade between 
Yunnan and Daxia.55 This information no doubt attracted the attention of the Han rulers 
who wished to establish connections with the Yuezhi in Central Asia. Although the Han 
expedition to Yunnan was disrupted by the Xiongnu conflicts, the Han empire founded 
the Yizhou Commandery (益州郡) in Yunnan in 109 BCE and confirmed the king of 
Dian’s legitimacy and title.   
 
53 YNTS, 15. 
54 YNTS, vol, 2, 17; Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 73-4. The first road was constructed by Li 
Bing (李冰), the governor (taishou 太守) of the Shu Prefecture, constructed the earliest roads, 
called five-foot-wide-roads (wuchidao 五尺道). 
55 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 76; Yu Ying-Shih, “Han Foreign Relations” in The 
Cambridge History of China, vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 BC-AD 220, ed. Denis 
Twitchett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 457-460. 
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 Yunnan became a new commandery under the Han dynasty, but it was still ruled 
by native chieftains. The state of Shu governed the lands of the “southwestern 
barbarians” which were called Nanzhong (南中) during the Three Kingdom Period (220-
280 CE).56 In response to the threats of native chieftains and their tribal followers, Zhuge 
Liang (181-284 CE) waged a campaign to pacify those communities deemed disobedient. 
Zhuge’s success brought material wealth and valuable resources for northern expeditions, 
such as horses, silver, furs, other local products and monetary taxes.57 In 339, the local 
Cuan (爨) clan’s control over Nanzhong had gained them a level of relative 
independence, although they had to request Chinese recognition of their authority over 
Nanzhong.58  
By the eighth century, the Meng (蒙) family established the Nanzhao Kingdom 
(738-902), which started a competitive relationship between the Nanzhao kingdom, the 
Tang empire, and the Tubo kingdom in Tibet. Had Tubo successfully expanded its power 
to southwestern China, the Tang could have been attacked in both front and rear on 
account of the Tubo kingdom’s geographic advantages in the east and northwest. 
Motivated by the Nanzhao kingdom’s trade relations with India, the Tang supported the 
unification of Nanzhao in the Erhai region. However, the Nanzhao kingdom alternated 
between enmity and alliance with both Tubo and Tang in order to contain their respective 
 
56 The Three Kingdoms period (220-280 CE) followed the Eastern Han Dynasty in 220 CE, 
dividing China into the kingdoms of Shu in Sichuan, Wu in Southeast China, and Wei in North 
China. 
57 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 78. 
58 John E. Herman, “The Kingdoms of Nanzhong China’s Southwest Border Region Prior to the 
Eighth Century,” T’oung Pao 95, no. 4 (2009):  267. The year 339 was the overlap period of the 
Jin dynasty (266-42 晉朝) and the Northern and Southern dynasties (386-589 南北朝). 
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expansion attempts.59 This was a new role for Yunnan and its residents who had never 
been drawn in to sit spectator to military campaigns and territorial expansion. Even when 
long-term military campaigns against the Tang empire weakened the power of Nanzhao, 
the flourishing Tang dynasty had not incorporated Yunnan as a province. Instead, another 
independent kingdom, the short-lived Changhe State (長和国), overthrew the Nanzhao 
kingdom and dominated the region from 902-928.60  
In 937, the rise of the Duan (段) clan and the Dali Kingdom (937-1253) opened a 
new relation with the contemporary Song dynasty (960-1279) that alternatingly made 
them allies or subjects.61 With the recognition of the Song-Dali relationship, the Dali 
Kingdom was not a subject to the Song, but a frontier regime that desired to trade with 
Song China. One of the major trading commodities was horses, which could better adapt 
to weather and performance in wars and transportation. The horse trade between the Dali 
Kingdom and the Song court had been a “major state project.”62  
The Yuan-Ming Conquest 
Powerful warhorses would not save the Song dynasty, which fell to Kublai Khan 
in 1253. The newly established Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) was China’s first foreign-
governed dynasty. Kublai Khan (1215-1294) did not stop his conquest after he achieved 
victory in the Yangzi River plain. His ultimate goal was to conquer Dali. Local leaders 
 
59 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 81. In the book, Yang describes military campaigns against 
Yunnan in a cross-regional analysis from the Qin empire to the Ming’s military victory over 
Yunnan.  
60 In western scholarship, the history of the Changhe state is rarely mentioned.  
61 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 89; for more information about the Dali Kingdom and Erhai 
District, refer to Ruizhi Lian “Surviving Conquest in Dali: Chiefs, Deities, and Ancestors”, in 
Chieftains into Ancestors: Imperial Expansion and Indigenous Society in Southwest China, ed. 
David Faure and Ho Ts’ui-p’ing (Vancouver, Toronto: UBC Press, 2013), 86-110. 
62 Bin Yang, “Horse, Silver, and Cowries: Yunnan and Global Perspective,” Journal of World 
History 15, no.3 (2004): 298. 
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throughout Yunnan reacted strongly against the invading Mongols, who challenged 
indigenous political and cultural pattern.63 To solve the resistance in Yunnan, Kublai 
Khan ordered his trusted minister Sayyid’Ajall Shams Al-Din (written in short: Shams 
Al-Din) to reorder Yunnan according to the principle of being “careful and 
magnanimous” in 1273.64 Culturally, although the Yuan regime was an “alien” dynasty, 
Shams Al-Din introduced Confucian rituals and Chinese traditions to Yunnan, including 
kneeling (kowtow) when greeting persons of authority or presenting petitions, 
matchmaking for marriage and marriage ceremonies, funerals, and ancestral worship, 
aiming to acculturate the natives according to Han-Chinese standards and thus increase 
the control over the indigenous communities.65  
As the leader of a multiethnic population Kublai Khan intended to rule over the 
vast population of the Han Chinese by copying the bureaucratic structure of the Song 
dynasty on a large scale. Kublai Khan gradually took control over Mongols, Central 
Asians, Han Chinese (former subjects of the Southern Song dynasty), and Jurchen (the 
former Jin dynasty). But in the empire’s far southwest region, chiefs and local rulers of 
the Dali Kingdom and neighboring indigenous tribes resisted the Mongol occupation. By 
appointing Shams Al-Din as Grand Councilor of Yunnan, the establishment of 
Temporary Yunnan Province (xingsheng行省) reorganized systematic control over 
Yunnan. But it did not successfully diminish the resistance by the various ethnicities. 
Therefore, the Yuan government conferred military titles to local chiefs according to the 
 
63 Laichen Sun, “Imperial Ideal Compromised: Northern and Southern Courts Across the New 
Frontier in the Early Yuan Era”. In China’s Encounters on the South and Southwest: Reforging 
the Fiery Frontier over Two Millennia, edited Anderson, James A & Whitmore, John K. (Leiden: 
Brill, 2014), 206. 
64 YNTS, vol. 4, 19. 
65 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 157. 
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number of households they controlled: Commander of Ten Thousand Households (wanhu
萬戶), Commander of One Thousand Households (qianhu千戶), and Commander of One 
Hundred Households (baihu百戶).66 This practice not only pacified the resistance of 
ethnic groups but also allowed the Yuan government to rule this multiethnic territory by 
using local worthies. In addition, the Mongols also conferred tusi titles upon indigenous 
rulers. The tusi system, therefore, emerged as a form of indirect rule that allowed the 
Chinese court to exercise imperial control over the empire’s indigenous frontier 
societies.67 While allowing the chieftains to maintain their traditions and autonomous rule 
over their territory and the local population, the Mongol empire used the tusi system as an 
“ideological tool” to sinicize the non-Han population and enhance its control over the tusi 
authority and local institutions.68  
When Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1368-1398) established the Ming dynasty in 1368, the 
Mongols still retained control over Yunnan. The Ming empire decided to conquer 
Yunnan for two main reasons: first, their inheritance of the Song Neo-Confucian 
ideology compelled them to spread their power and values to the remote regions; second, 
the Ming government felt vulnerable because the Mongol occupation of Dali increased 
the chances of an attack on China from the southwest.69 To resolve this vulnerability, Zhu 
Yuanzhang dispatched the Ming troops, and in 1381 successfully drove the Mongols out 
of the Ming territory and occupied Kunming and eastern Yunnan. The Duan clan no 
 
66 Xiaolin Guo, State and Ethnicity in China's Southwest (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 23.  
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the Tusi System of Late Imperial China (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), 1.  
68 Took, A Native Chieftaincy, 1; John E. Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s 
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longer ruled Dali independently. Instead, the Ming governor of Yunnan Mu Ying (1345-
1392沐英) pacified the local rebels and established peaceful relationships with 
surrounding countries.70  
The Ming dynasty adopted the native chieftain (tusi) system that the Mongols had 
introduced in Yunnan but pursued a further consolidation of the territory and legitimated 
their exploitation of the native population.71 Herman summarizes the Ming period 
relationship between the new frontier policy and the tusi office as a “patron-client-
territory” relationship, in which the primary focus of institutional control moved from 
land to people.72 In order to introduce Chinese culture to the indigenous non-Han 
population, groups of Han settlers were given incentives or orders to migrate to Yunnan. 
These settlers later dominated economic development and exploited natural resources for 
the empire’s interests. The new immigrants self-identified as civilized and loyal subjects 
to the imperial government, creating a vertically segregated settlement pattern that placed 
Han below and non-Han above.73 
The Ming’s establishment of new administrative institutions to oversee ethnic 
peoples had to rely on indigenous native officials (tuguan 土官). Given consideration to 
the complexities of the distribution of ethnic minorities, the Ming adopted different 
administrative approaches in the region. In lowland communities, all groups were 
 
70 Mu Ying (1345-1392) was a Chinese general. Mu and his descendants guarded Yunnan until 
the fall of the Ming dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang credited Mu Ying’s accomplishments by saying 
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registered as tax-paying subjects (min 民).74 Those groups were under direct control by 
the Ming government. In ethnic communities, the Ming government appointed tuguan to 
govern ethnic peoples in customary laws and to register their population (bian hukou編
戶口) as ethnic households (yihu夷戶).75 To some extent, this approach solved the 
inability of the Ming to impose direct rule over ethnic communities and expand its 
jurisdiction. The native officials gained excessive power to challenge the authority of the 
central government, which eventually triggered the abolishment of native officials and 
placed the imperial officials to govern the region.  
But upland communities remained isolated from the state power. James Scott calls 
these upland communities ‘Zomia,’ referring to stateless mountainous areas which 
resisted lowland influences and state incorporation.76 The Ming government launched a 
campaign against those internal frontiers in western Yunnan in 1573 and later constructed 
administrative centers.77 The arrival of Han settlers accelerated the incorporation of 
upland communities. From the eighteenth century, the basin population outnumbered the 
population in the mountains, and new settlers moved to the uplands on a large scale. The 
arrival of new immigrants increased agricultural yields and connected the uplands to the 
lowlands through commodity exchange. From the Ming dynasty onward, imperial 
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administrations began its colonization of the southwest with an aim to incorporate 
Yunnan as a permanent part of its territory by means of transforming local populations 
and exposing them to Han culture.  
Conclusion 
Although centralized regimes reached the southwestern region since the Qin 
dynasty, the region maintained an independent kingdom until Kublai Khan conquered the 
Dali Kingdom and established Yunnan Province. It was the same time that the notion of 
Yunnan emerged for the purpose of imposing Chinese cultural and political institutions 
upon local communities. The invention of the term Yunnan was not a coincidence of 
historical development but was an effective way to consolidate the centralized control 
and construct a unified identity for Yunnanese. The influences and the legacies of 
Chinese immigrants reflected how central government institutions and Confucian 
ideology began to transform Yunnan and its residents. The lowland basins expanded its 
control to the uplands by measures of territory expansion, cross-ethnic marriage, and 
trade exchanges. Those connections were largely facilitated by Han immigrants and the 
Ming government. Although the centralized power sought firm control over the region, 
the Ming government still relied on local elites to govern ethnic communities. Local 
elites then became “agents of cultural transformation” and reshaped ethnic identity in 
contacting with Han soldiers and Han-appointed local officials.78 Indigenous people 
played dynamic roles in responding to the expansion and the formation of Yunnan.  
Under the “core-periphery division,” the Han civilization had the obligation to 
assimilate and sinicize non-Han ethnics. The indigenous communities of ethnically 
 
78 Daniels and Ma, “Introduction: The Agency of Local Elites,” 6.  
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diverse backgrounds and the topographical diversity of the natural landscape promoted 
the development of policies of accommodation and acculturation. The narratives of 
accommodation and acculturation reflect both the tensions between the new Han-Chinese 
settlers and the indigenous population as well as both groups’ contributions to the 
creation of a new order and their profound mutual influences.79 It is hard to weigh the 
degree that peoples were sinicized and assimilated, but this one-sided perspective 
overshadows the narratives of how natives responded to imperial expectations. 
Economic breakdown, natural disasters, and massive rebellions eventually 
accelerated the collapse of the Ming. China was governed by another foreign ruling 
dynasty—the Qing. The Qing empire relied on its military forces to expand its territory to 
include Mongolia, Tibet, Dzungaria, Taiwan, and the southwestern regions. In those 
multicentered territories with diverse populations, the Qing faced dilemmas with regard 
to the complexity of cultural and ethnic groups that frequently engaged in borderland 
disputes. The Yongzheng emperor’s new official managed Yunnan by implementing 
radical policies. But were his frontier policies radical and aggressive? What significant 












COLONIALIZING YUNNAN DURING THE YONGZHENG REIGN  
 
 The Qing dynasty was the second dynasty of foreign domination that controlled 
the entire territory of China. It was also the last dynasty of imperial China until the 
Republic of China (ROC) overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1912. The dynasty was founded 
by the Manchus in the territory known as Manchuria, before they conquered China 
proper. The dynasty reached its most flourishing age (1644-1800) after Qing military 
forces had suppressed internal conflicts that had continued from the founding of the Qing 
until the territorial conquest that was completed under the reign of Kangxi (r.1661-1722).  
The Manchu Aisin Gioro clan established the Qing dynasty. The Manchus had 
been classified into three groups by the Ming government: the Wild (野人) Jurchen who 
occupied northern Manchuria, the Haixi (海西) Jurchen who lived along the Songhua 
River (in modern Heilongjiang), and the Jianzhou (建州) Jurchen who lived along the 
Mudan River, the Changbai mountains, and Liaodong. In 1616, after Nurhaci reunified 
the three Jurchen tribes, he established the Later Jin Dynasty (後金 1616-1636), a 
dynastic khanate in Manchuria whose name indicates the descent from the Jin dynasty 
(1115-1234). Nurhaci formed banners— administrative and military divisions—to 
incorporate Jurchen, Han Chinese, and Mongols into military units that soon functioned 
as powerful armies against the Ming dynasty. The Eight Banners system, a term that 
refers to administrative and military units which structured Qing subjects of the three 
 34 
main ethnicities—Manchu, Mongol and Han—into eight organizational groups.80 The 
banner system simultaneously functioned as a system of administration and 
confederation, allowing the Qing rulers to govern with their elite forces. Qing emperors 
relied on the Eight Banners in their military campaigns in the invasion of Korea, in the 
conquest of the Ming dynasty, in territorial expansion, and in quelling domestic revolts.  
Nurhaci declared war against the Ming dynasty as an answer to Ming crimes 
against the Jurchen.81 In order to strengthen centralized power and equalize economic 
distribution, Nurhaci curtailed the banner members’ economic power, increased the 
general food supply by raising livestock and economic crops, and conducted trade with 
neigboring countries under the guidance of the banner system.82 The Eight Banners and 
the powerful Manchu infantry were vulnerable to the Portuguese cannons, which were 
newly acquired by the Ming. Nurhaci’s defeat in the Battle of Ningyuan of 1726 (寧遠之
戰) resulted in his death in September 1626. His eighth son, Hong Taiji succeeded as the 
new khan. 
 
80 The respective groups used military flags with specific colors and decorative borders that 
signified the ethnicity of their members. To this day the term banner (旗) has survived in the 
names of former Qing military garrisons in rural locations of Inner Mongolia. 
81 Nurhaci announced Seven Grievances (七大恨), referring to crimes of the Ming dynasty: The 
Ming had murdered both Nurhaci’s grandfather and father; they had suppressed the Jianzhou 
clan; the Ming had violated the mutual agreement over territories; the Ming had allied with the 
Yehe clan against the Jianzhou Jurchen; the Ming had supported the Yehe thus breaking their 
promises to the Jianzhou; the Ming had forced Nurhaci to give up land; and Ming officials rode 
roughshod over the Jurchen. In the Battle of Sarhū, Nurhaci and his armies secured the Kaiyuan 
and Tieling garrisons and then subdued the Yehe-clan. Benefiting from these victories, the Later 
Jin extended to Liaodong when Nurhaci started a series of reforms. 
82 Gertraude Roth Li, “State Building Before 1644”, in The Cambridge History of China: vol. 9, 
part one: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 44-51. 
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 In a series of campaigns Hong Taiji conquered the region north of the Shanhai 
Pass (山海關). He defeated Ligdan Khan in Inner Mongolia, assumed leadership over 
Mongolia through taking Ligdan’s official seals, and allied with Korea in the years 
1634/5.83 In 1636, Hong Taiji renamed the Later Jin as the Da Qing (大清), the empire of 
Great Clarity.84 The rebellion in western Shaanxi led by Li Zicheng (1606-1645 李自成), 
natural disasters and famines in northern China, and the rise of the Manchus accelerated 
the decline and the fall of the Ming dynasty. In 1643 Hong Taiji was succeeded by the 
Shunzhi emperor who was five years old at the time. Before his death, Hong Taiji had 
appointed his half-brother Dorgon (1612-1650多爾袞) as Prince-regent. Prince Dorgon 
joined forces with Wu Sangui, the Ming general who had fought against Li Zicheng’s 
rebel army. Together they defeated Li Zicheng in the Battle at the Shanhai Pass in 
May,1644. This victory opened access to China for the Qing army. In the following 
month, the Manchu army entered the capital Beijing and established a new dynasty: The 
Great Qing (1644-1912).  
 Dorgon’s unexpected death in 1650 brought the Shunzhi emperor to power. At the 
time only thirteen years old, Shunzhi established the Hanlin Academy (Hanlin shuyuan
翰林書院) and the Grand Secretariat (neige內閣), two government institutions that were 
controlled by Han-Chinese scholar-officials, weakening the power of the Manchu elites. 
In February 1661, Shunzhi’s sudden death of smallpox at the age of twenty-two left the 
throne to his third son, Xuanye (玄燁) who reigned for sixty years under the reign title 
 
83 The capture of Ligdan’s seal legitimated the rulership of Hong Taiji for the Mongols and 
secured the control of their economy. See Li Gertraude Roth, “State Building,” 56. 
84 The name followed the new naming tradition begun by the Mongol Yuan dynasty, which used 
an abstract principle instead of a geographic name for the dynasty. 
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“Kangxi.” The Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) spent nearly forty years to take control 
over China proper through military campaigns, including ordering the Great Evacuation 
campaign in 1661, the suppression of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories in 1681, and 
the defeat of the Taiwan-based rebel clan of the Zheng family, better known as the clan 
of Koxinga, in 1683.85  
To govern the Han Chinese as a non-Han regime, the new Qing ruled over China 
as ‘Sons of Heaven’ assuming Confucian orthodoxy. They mitigated their “barbarians” 
ways, which were considered culturally inferior by the Han, in order to claim legitimacy 
for themselves and be recognized as part of the genealogy of Chinese dynasties.86 But in 
territories with a diverse population, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and the southwestern tribal 
areas, the Qing faced complex cultural and ethnic groups who frequently engaged in 
borderland disputes. To govern groups of diverse ethnicities, the Qing established the 
Bureau of Frontier Affairs (Lifan Yuan理藩院) to supervise the Qing frontier in Inner 
Asia and the occupation of the southwest. To solve the problem of social unrest the 
Kangxi emperor followed the policy of “using barbarians to govern barbarians” (yi yi zhi 
yi以夷制夷) and relied on native officials (tusi土司) to extend the reach of the central 
administration. After the tusi system had fallen apart following military campaigns, the 
 
85 These major campaigns occurred during the transition from the Ming to the Qing. It started 
with the collapse of the Ming and ended with the Qing unification of outer Manchuria, Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. William Rowe summarizes these campaigns under the title 
“Dynastic Consolidation”. For more details about the individual campaigns, see William Rowe, 
China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 24-30; Pamela K. Crossley, “The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire”, in The 
Cambridge History of China: Volume 9, part one: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard 
Peterson (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 326-345.  
86 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 12; Wang Hui, China from Empire to Nation-State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), 116-7. 
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Qing government brought indigenous populations under state control by abolishing native 
chieftainship.  
The powerful military force was the key to expanding territory and conquering the 
leftover Ming forces and frontier regions. Kangxi’s successor, Emperor Yongzheng, still 
lacked authority over Yunnan’s frontier communities, a situation that stood in conflict 
with his goal to bring all areas of the empire under central control. To explore the 
Yongzheng emperor’s expansion to Yunnan, this chapter traces two reforms: one 
concerns the military suppression and imposition of institutional reform, and the other 
was using education in the process of civilizing the ethnic population. 
The Initial Expansion (1722-1726)  
The Yongzheng emperor favored using military force to preserve the Great Qing 
by relying on his loyal supporters and military commanders in stabilizing the dynasty. 
Yongzheng colonized the southwest by sending provincial officials to destroy indigenous 
control in several regions and to “force frontier military, political, and spatial realities” to 
fit Qing interests and political plans.87 To achieve his goal, Yongzheng sent his trusted 
officials Gao Qizhuo (1676-1738高其倬) and Li Wei (1687? -1738李衛) to lead the 
colonization process in Yunnan. The officials believed that through collecting taxes for 
land, salt, and other local resources, serious fiscal problems caused by the military 
expansion could be solved and new garrisons and new troops could be financed to 
strengthen imperial control in the southwest.88  
 
87 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 44-62; Guo, State and Ethnicity, 27-9. 
88 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 46-8. 
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Gao Qizhuo, who was a jinshi (進士) of 1694 and a baron of the third class (held 
from 1723-1738), was appointed governor-general of Yunnan in 1722. In his memorial to 
the emperor Yongzheng, Gao reported how he had changed Yunnan in the initial phase: 
Alongside the hundreds of miles of the river and on the open lands in valleys, 
indigenous people were encouraged to cultivate crops. In areas where old 
cultivation fields of Dian tea were located, we could use the experience of 
Kangding as an example for collecting salt revenues.89 
In the extreme south of Yunnan Province, Gao stationed generals in Pu’er and garrisons 
in Weiyuan and Chashan (in the hills east of Simao). Gao achieved two major goals: first, 
he established imperial officials in Weiyuan and simultaneously relocated tuguan to the 
city and thus replaced the authority of local worthies with the authority of imperial 
officials; second, he secured the imperial oversight of the regional salt wells in Zhenyuan 
fu (鎮沅府). 90 The latter step helped to offset the serious fiscal burden caused by the 
dispatch of growing numbers of imperial soldiers, with the revenues gained from the salt 
monopoly. 
 To prevent Gao from gaining excessive power in Yunnan, emperor Yongzheng 
sent Li Wei to supervise and cooperate with Gao Qizhuo, with the goal to manage 
Yunnan and expand the empire through military occupation.91 Early in 1723, Li was sent 
 
89 QSG, liezhuan 79. 
90 QSG, liezhuan 79; YZTZ, juan 11. Zhenyuan fu, a remote region which was surrounded by high 
hills and forests, located in the border region with Burma, adjacent to Yuanjiang and Jinghong. 
91 Li Wei (李衛) was a prominent bureaucrat during the Yongzheng reign. Li Wei was trusted by 
the Yongzheng emperor. Unlike Gao Qizhuo, who was an official recruited through the civil 
service examination, Li Wei was not a bannerman and he even purchased the rank of an assistant 
department director. Li Wei’s most famous achievement was that he had transformed the 
“individual tax” into a land tax (分丁入畝) in Zhejiang in 1727. The abolition of the poll tax not 
only helped stabilize the feudal government’s taxation and fostered population growth, but also 
freed peasants from the privileges of landlords. The more land a landlord controlled, the higher 
the taxes which were procured from the peasants]. Although Li Wei was less educated, emperor 
Yongzheng appreciated his talent and skills. In turn, Li Wei in his memorial to Yongzheng, said 
“The recognition from your Majesty means a lot to your humble servant who is ordinary and has 
nothing special. I can only repay your kindness by serving you and the Qing empire with loyalty.” 
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to Yunnan at the rank of a provincial salt intendant (yanyidao鹽驛道) and was charged 
with organizing the chaotic structure of the salt industry, which was in the hands of local 
indigenous leaders. In 1724, Li became the financial commissioner (buzhengshi布政使) 
of Yunnan. To address the emperor’s concerns of administrative and fiscal reform, Li 
stationed troops in the salt-producing areas so that the indigenous leaders no longer 
managed salt production and salt transportation.92  
Gao Qizhuo noticed that the sale of private salt was greater than the sale of 
government salt because the official salt bureaucracy purchased salt at a low price. 
Consequently, the more salt was smuggled from Yunnan into neighboring states, the 
higher the retail price tagged on Yunnan’s salt market became. Gao Qizhuo, therefore, 
banned the private salt trade and officially purchased the salt from the individual salt 
producers. The Qing government sold the salt based on the market price. Eliminating 
costs of labor and raw materials deposited additional profits into the local treasury. Gao 
Qizhuo listed the total surplus from salt sales of the year 1723 and its distribution: “the 
province’s annual salt revenue surplus was about 17,463 taels. At least 1,000 taels were 
deposited monthly, and bi-annual deposits reached 24,000 taels, which were used to 
reward soldiers and raise troops. The surplus of 6,436 taels was deposited for the 
provincial government for future annual costs.”93 After Li Wei assumed the position as 
salt intendant in 1723, the surplus from salt sales reached 55,315 taels in 1725.94 
Although it remains unclear for which purposes and how the portion of salt surplus was 
 
92 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 46. 
93 GZDYZ, vol. 2, 195. 
94 GZDYZ, vol. 4, 421- 423. 
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allocated, it relieved the fiscal burdens on the Qing government in Beijing and also 
increased budget for the recruitment of troops.  
While the Qing regime increased its control over Yunnan step-by-step, the salt 
industry and agricultural production became equally important to support the local 
development. Gao Qizhuo turned his attention to stabilizing the grain prices and securing 
an equal price for the entire province. Because Yunnan is located in a mountainous area 
Gao Qizhuo noticed that grain circulation was limited locally because short- and long-
distance transportation increased labor costs and thus increased the selling price. The 
grain price in the provincial capital was higher than in the prefectures. To solve this 
problem, Gao personally donated 500 taels to reclaim more than 3,000 acres of arable 
land, with 2,300 acres dedicated to barley cultivation and 1,000 acres to rice farming. For 
local people who were willing to plant but worried about the taxes, Gao determined that 
per acre of rice farming only one dou (斗= about 10 kilograms) of rice would be 
collected; one dou and two sheng (升=about 10.3 kilograms) of barley would be collected 
per acre of barley cultivation. The construction of dams along the water gates aimed to 
dimmish the dangers from floods and drought. When the gates were constructed, the 
water could flow freely into the fields and thus farming would facilitate normal harvests 
even in the drought seasons. By overcoming potential environmental threats and boosting 
agricultural cultivation, the common people achieved a reliable food supply. But military 
troops and households in the province’s northwest still relied on food transportation from 
inland China. In order to save labor and transportation costs, Gao Qizhuo planned to 
reclaim arable land alongside the river and flat areas. By providing farming tools and 
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cattle, local cultivation supported the local military instead of relying on inland 
transportation.95 
Although Gao Qizhuo and Li Wei managed the provincial economy to solve the 
military expenditure through the empire’s administrative reforms, barbaric rebels had 
represented a threat to the locals for decades, especially in the southern part of the 
province. In November, 1723, Pu Youcai (普有才; precise dates unknown) was protected 
by local chieftain Dao Guanghuan (刀光煥; precise dates unknown); they further allied 
and became friends, and their sons became as close as brothers. They refused Gao 
Qizhuo’s attempt of pacification and fled to the forests. Therefore, Gao Qizhuo 
determined that only replacing native officials with imperial bureaucrats and stationed 
troops could solve the problems brought upon by the ‘wild rebels’ (yezei 野賊).96 In 
1724, Gao Qizhuo admitted that hunting the bandits in hills and forests was much more 
difficult compared to chasing them in stockaded villages. Forceful military suppression 
could also lead to a great loss of soldiers. Compared to the Qing soldiers whose 
vulnerability to malaria limited their movements in the mountains, tribal rebels easily 
used the forest as a natural hideaway. Gao Qizhuo ordered Qing soldiers to round up the 
rebels on three sides and to block their access to the mountains. He also alerted the public 
to watch out for rebels and by publicizing awards for anyone who reliably reported rebel 
hideouts, who caught rebels, or who persuaded the rebels to surrender.97 The rebels were 
gradually controlled by the Qing officials and later were executed. This victory allowed 
 
95 GZDYZ, vol. 2, 526 
96 GZDYZ, vol.2, 710. 
97 GZDYZ, vol. 3, 184-185. 
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the Qing empire to make a big step towards the control of Yunnan and its indigenous 
population. 
The Ensuing Expansion and the Gaitu Guiliu Policy 
Upon the arrival of E’ertai, Gao Qizhuo and Li Wei had already changed Yunnan: 
the former had conquered the salt-production regions and the latter had increased the salt 
revenues. Their initial expansion not only altered the economics of frontier communities 
but also laid the foundation for E’ertai to rely on extreme violence in this colonialization 
efforts and undermine the power of the indigenous elite in the southwest beginning in 
the1720s. E’ertai (1680-1745) received his degree as a juren (舉人) 98 in 1699. Four 
years later, in 1703, he was promoted to Senior Imperial Bodyguard of the third rank (三
等侍衛), and in 1722 he advanced to become an examiner for the civil service exams in 
Yunnan province (雲南鄉試考官). In 1725, he was appointed as governor-general of the 
southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. By introducing Yunnan as a remote 
region bordering with Burma, E’ertai in his report demonstrates that only by replacing 
local and hereditary rulers with imperial bureaucrats and deploying the military could the 
empire stabilize and pacify native populations. The Qing officials called this policy gaitu 
guiliu (改土歸流), which indicated that the Qing aimed to consolidate the peripheral 
control under the central government. It largely diminished the autonomous leadership of 
native rulers, but it also earned E’ertai a promotion to Grand Chancellor (軍機大臣). 
 
98 Imperial China recruited candidates for the state bureaucracy by selecting state officials who 
had passed the imperial civil service examinations. For men who were born into the lower 
classes, achieving good results in the civil service examination was the only way to become a 
bureaucrat as well as the chance to alter their own lives and those of their families. The merit-
based appointment system mitigated aristocratic power and centralized power around the 
emperor . ‘Juren’ was a rank lower than the highest degree, jinshi but higher than the shengyuan. 
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The biggest challenge in E’ertai’s assignment was the resistance from the Miao 
(苗) tribe. He reported the situation of Yunnan and Guizhou and his solution for the local 
conflicts to the Yongzheng emperor by saying: 
Yunnan and Guizhou have no big concerns without the Miao and Man [tribes]. To 
pacify local populations means to deal with yi (barbarians); to govern the 
barbarians means that local hereditary rulers have to be replaced with imperial 
bureaucrats. […] I (your servant) believe the reason why the local population 
showed resistance to the imperial actions of the Ming [administration] was 
because the Ming officials did not learn about the local customs in remote frontier 
regions. Therefore, the local populations showed resistance against the imperial 
actions. […] The solution is to first capture the local leaders with a smart strategy 
and then attack the resisting population with military force; it is best to request 
that local leaders turn themselves in; forcing them to surrender is the second way. 
In order to attack the barbarians, we have to select generals who are able to train 
soldiers. If we can impartially dispense awards and punishment, the new soldiers 
will obey orders. Resisting foreign aggression after stabilizing the country is a 
long-term benefit in the frontier regions.99 
E’ertai’s effective methods put down the Miao uprisings successfully, but also brought 
him the reputation of being ruthless. His vigorous land reforms and household 
registration for tax collection caused the indigenous inhabitants’ resistance. About 18,000 
local people were massacred and more than 1000 villages were torched in the Guizhou 
rebellion of 1735-1736.100  
In 1726, E’ertai arrived in Yunnan with the mission to transform the frontier, 
because the indigenous people had resisted the Qing pacification campaigns. The main 
challenge E’ertai faced in his early years was how to manage the indigenous people in 
Yunnan. E’ertai’s radical colonial policies were informed by stereotypes against the 
indigenous population, describing them as living “outside” of the state territory and being 
led by native officials labeled as “uncivilized rebels” and “frontier barbarians.”101 This 
 
99 QSG, liezhuan 75. 
100 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 80. 
101 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 49-50. 
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language directly influenced the Qing emperor’s decisions. Later, E’ertai and his armies 
invaded Xishuangbanna to bring the “Pu’er” tea industry under imperial control and 
stationed imperial forces in Simao and Muong Ham (in today’s Vietnam), claiming “only 
strong armies of suppression could transform the heart of Xishuangbanna’s 
barbarians.”102  
In order to stabilize the Yunnan-Sichuan border, E’ertai requested Yunnan’s 
jurisdiction to take charge of the Dongchuan (東川) region. Although Dongchuan had the 
fertile soil for agricultural production, nobody dared to reclaim the land because of the 
fear that Dongchuan’s indigenous people would abduct farmers and plunder livestock. 
E’ertai alerted that only supervising Dongchuan by the Yunnan provincial administration 
and its military garrisons could prevent further insurgencies and troubles made by local 
people in Dongchuan.103 The Yongzheng emperor responded to E’ertai by saying: if local 
chiefs from Wumeng, Sichuan, provoked troubles in the Dongchuan region, the Qing 
officials are allowed to punish them according to Qing law; the replacement of the tusi 
with Chinese officials would benefit the region in the future.104  
Although E’ertai fiercely supported the military in suppressing ethnic 
insurgencies and securing the control of economic resources, non-human agents, such as 
climate and topography constituted impediments against the effectiveness of his frontier 
reforms. In his report about the observation of indigenous officials, E’ertai admitted that:  
… in the remote and uninhabited wilderness occupied by stubborn barbarians, the 
Qing local political institutions had to rely on indigenous officials in solving local 
rebellions. The government should replace native officials with Qing-appointed 
officials; native officials who cannot be replaced easily or should not be replaced, 
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should be allowed to maintain their old traditions, but the government needs to 
restrict their authority to prevent abuse of power. If native officials abuse their 
authority to loot property of the common people or jeopardize Qing authority in 
Yunnan, they will be punished severely.105 
This edict points to the fact that the Qing frontier order in Yunnan was a compromise. 106 
E’ertai’s recognition of the limits of the Qing expansion was aggravated by the local 
malaria infestation, which prevented the Green Standard Army of Han Chinese 
bannermen from being stationed in the garrisons. Prone to contracting malaria, the lack of 
Qing soldiers compelled the dynasty to maintain the positions of native chieftains, 
although indigenous leaders often challenged Qing control.107 Malaria and the tribal 
culture of Yunnan constrained the Qing expansion and territorial consolidation, which 
explains how the Qing had to find compromises between the frontier policies, indigenous 
agents, and the environmental challenges. 
If the Gaitu Guiliu policy achieved political integration, the Qing government 
then urgently needed cultural integration to construct a unified cultural system throughout 
the region. ‘Barbarians’ could become loyal subjects to the Qing empire only after they 
were civilized. Another Qing official arrived in Yunnan and intended to incorporate the 
indigenous population through the state-oriented education projects.  
Chen Hongmou and His Education Approach 
In 1733, Chen Hongmou (1696-1771陳宏謀) was granted the position of Yunnan 
treasurer, which credited him as an exemplary official. The position required him to 
conduct economic reforms and establish a public-school system. In Chen’s first tenure as 
105 GZDYZ, vol. 6, 422-4. 
106 David. A Bello, “To Go Where No Han Could Go for Long: Malaria and the Qing 
Construction of Ethnic Administrative Space in Frontier Yunnan,” Modern China 31, no. 3. (July 
2005): 283-309. 
107 Bello, “To Go Where No Han,” 288, 301. 
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the treasurer of Yunnan, he saw that the Yunnanese were unfairly targeted by economic 
and cultural changes when the southwest became a part of a military campaign that 
intended to make the non-Han minorities into servants of the Qing empire.108 
Descriptions of southwest populations were always patronizing. Throughout his three-
year tenure in Yunnan Chen Hongmou thought his duty and goal was to guide the natives 
to improve their material life by introducing advanced cropping systems and agricultural 
infrastructure and to lift the individual morale through cultivating popular religious 
practices and ritual ceremonies.109  
Chen Hongmou’s civilizing projects were inspired by Zhang Yunsui, the governor 
of Yunnan since 1718. Although Zhang Yunsui agreed that indigenous people in Yunnan 
were cruel and barbaric, he still favored “policies of accommodation” to coopt 
indigenous leaders for managing indigenous populations in remote and tropical areas 
where no Qing officials could go.110 Zhang endorsed policies of accommodation with 
goals of moral transformation by exposing barbarians to imperial morality and the 
universal value of humaneness. Zhang Yunsui’s policies had obvious benefits for 
economic and social cooperation, but he confronted challenges from both indigenous 
communities and the Qing government. Even though indigenous aristocrats actively used 
the Qing political structure and new cultural forms as a resource, certain groups of native 
populations still retained a more intimate relationship with upland Southeast Asia. On the 
other hand, the Qing-appointed officials had problems in understanding the native 
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customs. Consequently, the Qing emperors granted Qing titles and gifts to recognize local 
rulers’ legitimacy of power in the frontier on behalf of the empire and praise their 
abilities to spread the imperial value system to the remote and interior frontier. 
Accordingly, although the relationship between the Qing empire and native officials was 
integrated into the imperial hierarchy, the imperial government did not always have 
absolute power.  
Although Governor-General Zhang Yunsui appreciated the military presence as 
an important imperial institution to maintain peace throughout the empire’s southwest 
frontier, his policies of frontier accommodation mentored Chen Hongmou in seeking 
civilizing influences in the southwest. Chen’s recognition of cultural differences inspired 
him to proceed with his second mission: to civilize indigenous populations. In contrast to 
E’ertai’s progressive bias of ensuring the superiority of the Han Chinese, Chen equaled 
Han majority and ethnic minorities as subjects to the Qing empire. He insisted that all 
humans can be civilized (有教無類) because the philosopher Mencius’ doctrine about 
‘human nature was good at birth’ was true for both Chinese and non-Chinese, and 
therefore, all cultural practices could be reformed.111 His goal of “turning the savages into 
Chinese (Yi bian wei Han夷變為漢)” and “the correction of moral errors (jiaohua 教
化)” was at the core of the curriculum in his free public schools (charity schools; yixue義
 
111 Li Wenlong 李文龍, “Frontier Education and National Identity Education in the Middle of 
Qing Dynasty—Chen Hongmou and the Development of Free School (清中期邊疆教化與國家
認同教育—陳宏謀與義學發展),”Journal of Research on Education for Ethnic Minorities 30, 
no.1 (2019):115. 
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學).112 In general, his yixue educational project had two goals: cultivating a shared 
identity and educating proper manners. 
The Qing political goal of conquest required the stabilized imperial rule in the 
frontier and the reinforcement of indigenous peoples’ shared identity, which had to be 
achieved by means of the regional correction of ‘moral errors.’113 Literacy training 
became one way to cultivate moral values. Selected textbooks included  Zhu Xi’s 
Household Maxims (朱子治家格言)114, Reflection on Things at Hand (近思錄)115 and 
other collections of conversations of the classics of Chinese philosophy. Chen insisted on 
the naturalness (zhixing知行) of Confucian principles of social order, filial piety, moral 
characters, and loyalty in rational and ritually correct familial norms.116 The selection of 
teaching materials indicated that the Qing government attached great importance to social 
education and moral training, using the acceptance of Confucianism as a symbol of 
submission to the Qing. In the eyes of imperial dynasties, any civilized cultural identity 
had to resonate with the Confucian principles.  
In addition to training in literacy, Chen added regulation of behavior norms into 
his yixue curriculum. Chen applied Zhu Xi’s code of conduct to introduce the importance 
of dressing properly, speaking and walking in humble and appropriate ways, keeping the 
table and house neat, learning course content by heart, and obeying polite and respectful 
 
112 Rowe, Saving the World, 423-6. 
113 Li, “Frontier Education,” 116. 
114 Household Maxim was written by Zhu Bolu (1627-1698 朱柏盧), an educator in the later 
Ming era. The book focuses on family ethics and outstanding characteristics of Chinese 
traditional culture, such as diligent housekeeping, harmonious relationships among neighbors, 
and respect for teachers. 
115 Reflection on Things at Hand was compiled by the Neo-Confucian thinkers Zhu Xi and Lü 
Zuqian.  
116 Rowe, Saving the World, 422. 
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manners.117 Those basic norms instructed students and children—who due to their young 
age still had little resistance to the Han—in the rules for being a proper civilized person 
who knew how to draw a line between savage behaviors and civilized norms. Similarly, 
Qing officials aimed to assimilate ethnic culture with Han Chinese culture by mandating 
Confucian wedding and burial rites as well as ancestor worship, ordering Chinese-style 
costume to cover the natives’ naked bodies, and introducing  the cult of virtuous 
widowhood (jiexiao節孝) and the Confucian worship of Heaven (tiandao天道).118 
Chen Hongmou’s goals to civilize indigenous peoples in Yunnan also witnessed a 
significant increase in the number of yixue schools. In 1733, when Chen Hongmou 
started his career in Yunnan, there were only two hundred local schools, some of which 
offered little education; at the time of his departure from Yunnan in 1738, roughly seven 
hundred schools had been built or revitalized.119 Chen Hongmou’s education project and 
yixue systems in Yunnan served as carriers of imperial doctrines and Confucian 
principles aiming to encourage economic prosperity and civilizing influences. Although 
Chen’s achievements were visible in motivating the construction of Han cultural and 
social modes in Yunnan, the ambitious goal of the Yongzheng emperor and his “new 
men” to assimilate indigenous populations ended in failure because of the enormous 
ethnic diversity. While selectively adopting certain practices such as learning Chinese 
 
117 Zhu Xi, What Children Must Know (Tongmeng Xuzhi 童蒙須知).  
118 Rowe, Saving the World, 422,424; Liao Guoqiang, “ ‘Civilizing the Ethnics by Han Culture’ 
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Government-Dispatched Officials in Yunnan,(以漢化夷與因俗而治—清代雲南改土歸流地區
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and attending public elementary schools, the native population rejected the uniformity of 
the dress code and the practices of footbinding and arranged marriages.  
Conclusion  
The Yongzheng emperor further consolidated Yunnan and ethnic population 
under the control of the Qing government. In the early stage of expansion, Gao Qizhuo 
and Li Wei secured valuable industries in the hands of the Qing and collected taxes to 
support military expenses. Their efforts allowed E’ertai to initiate radical policies to 
suppress the armed rebels, to replace local officials with Qing bureaucrats, and to 
promote social change in Yunnan. The Yongzheng emperor took advantage of the 
military to colonialize Yunnan and impose a series of reforms that led to the 
incorporation of Yunnan into the Qing empire, but the education measures thoroughly 
consolidated Yunnan’s ethnic populations. Upon Chen Hongmou’s arrival, he advocated 
for a Confucian education through building a public elementary school system. In effect, 
indigenous communities began to accept being “Chinese” and show less resistance to 
imperial rule.  
During the process of settling in Yunnan, many new settlers married indigenous 
women. The child of a mixed marriage might have been taught in either or both of the 
parents’ ways which strengthened their position in relation to the Qing and impeded the 
distinction of natives from Han.120 In the fear of losing control over both, the Qing state 
considered that “Chinese cultural institutions could penetrate indigenous societies and 
peacefully erase the cultural barriers” between the Qing empire and the population in the 
southwestern frontier.121 Qing officials observed that Han residents in Yunnan were 
 
120 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 190. 
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weaving a new cultural tapestry, and they realized that a Chinese education system could 
be considered a peaceful but effective method to civilize the “savage customs” (yesu野
俗) of the indigenous, non-Han population and to prevent the “barbarization” of Han 
settlers.122  
Throughout the Yongzheng reign, the emperor and the central government 
enhanced the state control over the southwest and erased the cultural barriers between the 
Qing empire and the non-Han population of the southwestern frontier. The initial stage of 
the Qing expansion provided relatively stable conditions for the future development in 
the eighteenth century. When a large influx of Han immigrants resettled in Yunnan to 
explore the vast unexploited but fertile land, the landscape and society had been 
transformed. The government-sponsored immigrants from 1726 not only reflect how 
natives and Han settlers jointly built Yunnan but also how they facilitated the integration 















BORDERLAND RESETTLEMENT AND THE GROWTH OF THE BORDERLAND 
ECONOMY 
 
The previous chapter addresses how the Manchus’ military strength enabled 
emperor Yongzheng and his trusted officials to colonize Yunnan by means of military 
suppression and economic reforms. Yongzheng’s “new frontier militarism” became the 
essential and effective approach to introducing colonialization policies and undermining 
the influence of indigenous leaders.123 By securing salt revenues and valuable agricultural 
production, the Qing empire increased the number of the Green Standard forces, which 
was mostly made up of Han-Chinese soldiers. Although the garrison system included 
soldiers of the Eight Banners from Manchu, Mongol, and Han armies, the Manchu rulers 
preferred deploying Han soldiers to suppress the rebellions and establish garrisons in 
Yunnan for two major reasons. First, the Manchu rulers desired to keep the non-Chinese 
banner forces insulated from contact with the overwhelming mass of the Chinese 
population to preserve Manchu identity.124 Second, they were convinced that Han 
soldiers were culturally and physically better suited to fight the ethnic minorities of the 
subtropical area to which Manchu soldiers had a hard time acclimatizing.  
Soon Yunnan witnessed an increasing number of Han immigrants from Jiangxi, 
Huguang (Hubei and Hunan), and the southeast coast who were attracted by mining 
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resources and trade opportunities. They complemented the deployed Chinese soldiers of 
the Green Standard army until the steady influx of Han immigrants made them the 
population majority in the region, where they introduced the newly imported agricultural 
crops of maize, cotton, tobacco, and potatoes. 
This chapter will reflect upon the experiences and contributions by the native 
population and the Han settlers in building the new order. To illustrate the complexity of 
tensions between Han settlers and the indigenous population as well as the areas of their 
collaboration, the chapter focuses on how the transformation of commercial trade 
facilitated the emerging of a new Yunnan.  
The Arrival of Chinese Immigrants 
 From 1726 through 1731, E’ertai occupied indigenous areas and enhanced Qing 
political control over the empire’s periphery. Native chieftains’ power was weakened by 
limiting their direct rule over the southwest and its ethnic communities. A series of tax 
reforms secured the imperial authority over the region, although the power transition was 
dominated by incidents of rebellions. The Qing government realized that violence and 
instability interfered with long-term strategies to transform frontier politics, culture, and 
economics. In order to build an orderly and civilized frontier, the reliance on education 
through a general elementary school system proved necessary. At a cultural level, 
China’s charitable schools offered Han-style curricula for natives who were expected to 
adopt Chinese culture and emulate a new Han identity and for the descendants of new 
Han settlers who were expected to maintain cultural ties to the Qing empire.  
It was the Han settlers who thoroughly transformed patterns across the landscape 
and the frontier society through expanding agricultural production and managing long-
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distance trade.125 In chapter one, we saw the invention of Yunnan and the initial 
transformation through the imperial expansion, which later facilitated a massive human 
migration. The impact of immigration on Yunnan had a longer history. The Yuan 
conquest of Dali in 1273 and the Qing conquest of the Ming in 1673 brought the initial 
immigration, followed by a second wave from 1700 to the rebellions of the 1850s.126 
Historian James Lee has defined the migration as two waves of immigration because each 
phase had distinct features and a profound impact on integrating the frontier and 
encouraging local development.  
The first wave of settlers was made up of the vast majority of military soldiers 
and their attached military households who were not predominantly of Han Chinese 
ethnicity, but consisted of Mongols, Manchus, and Muslims.127 Although those military 
immigrants had a diverse background, they commonly identified as belonging to the 
Chinese polity and distinguished them from the indigenous communities. The lack of 
imperial consolidation limited the initial interaction between new settlers and indigenous 
peoples when the former was responsible only for reclaiming wastelands to supply food 
for the imperial garrisons. The second wave of immigration introduced new, advanced 
agricultural technologies and crops with higher yields. Immigrants of the second wave 
predominantly came from the middle and upper Yangzi River, one of the most 
prosperous regions in China thanks to intense rice cultivation and a highly developed 
artisanal craft production.  
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In the following section I will analyze how the legacies of the second wave of 
immigration in agrarian expansion and its most visible consequence—frontier 
urbanization. The growth of population and commerce largely fueled further connection 
between the empire’s periphery and its neighboring states. Through the development of 
the caravan trade, we shall see how Yunnan retained its role as the central section of the 
transport routes for a vast array of commodities. 
Agrarian Expansion and Frontier Urbanization 
 The large-scale settlement of Yunnan had flourished after the Yongzheng 
emperor’s incorporation of the southwest. Upon the arrival of the new settlers in Yunnan 
the shift to Han-style sedentary agriculture fostered the emergence of new markets and 
the development of cross-regional trade. The Chinese-style agriculture and its economic 
consequences of urbanization, market expansion, and luxury consumption characterized 
the “second commercial revolution” from the mid-sixteenth century to the end of the 
eighteenth century.128 The study of the Jiangnan region has been associated with the 
flourishing of material culture, which was a characteristic of the High Qing era. The salt 
monopoly allowed the salt merchants to accumulate wealth that led to their advanced 
economic status. Surplus profits were utilized to produce artifacts and handicrafts of 
excellent quality which were sent as tribute to the Qing court and the royal family. The 
salt merchants thus became “cultured and cosmopolitan men” (tongren 同人) who 
expanded their influence throughout the Qing realm and helped the empire build 
transregional networks with neighboring states.129  
 
128 Yulian Wu, Luxurious Networks: Salt Merchants, Status, and Statecraft in Eighteenth-Century 
China (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 200-1. 
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 The development of the Yunnan and Jiangnan regions was strikingly different 
during the High Qing period. In Yunnan slash-and-burn agriculture (daogeng huozhong
刀耕火種) was practiced by minority groups, especially by inhabitants in the hilly and 
mountainous areas.130 In Xishuangbanna, Jinuo (基諾) and Dai farmers burned the fields 
after harvesting upland rice between November and December and sowed upland rice in 
May.131 With this traditional production method, the daily demand for rice could barely 
be met. Hunting and gathering supplemented the basic food demand and shaped the 
special living mode--men hunted wild animals as a source of protein in the sub-tropical 
forests and women gathered mushrooms, edible wild plants, bamboo shoots, and nuts.132 
These traditions were considered backward and barbaric by the new Han settlers.  
New immigrants who settled in the mountains and valleys confronted the shortage 
of arable farmland. In order to overcome these constraints, immigrants cultivated new 
and high yielding crops such as maize and sweet potatoes.133 Intensive cultivation in the 
remote hills and valleys encouraged people’s engagement in regional markets, leading to 
growth in transregional trade. Those living in mountainous or hilly terrain and villagers 
from remote regions and from the lowlands relied on the standard markets (gaizi 街子)134 
for trade. Before the arrival of Han immigrants, gaizi functioned as local markets where 
highlanders and lowlanders exchanged local basic goods, such as grain, fruits, livestock, 
 
130 Slash-and-burn agriculture is a type of shifting cultivation, involving cutting and burning 
plants and trees to create a field. 
131 Shigeru Shirasaka, “Slash-and-Burn Cultivation in Xishuangbanna, Southwestern China,” 
Geographical Review of Japan 68, no.2 (1995): 110. 
132 Shirasaka, “Slash-and-Burn,”112. 
133 Maize and potatoes have become most important cash crops in the marginal farming lands in 
Yunnan until these days.   
134 In Yunnanese dialects, the pronunciation of jie (街) is different from standard Mandarin 
Chinese. In most cases, jiezi refers to a street. By contrast, gaizi refers to a local general market.  
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and cloth. Agricultural expansion witnessed not only an increase in agricultural yield and 
crop diversity but also an increase in the diversity of exchange commodities. Vegetables, 
tobacco, raw cotton, salt, and agricultural tools became important commodities bartered 
between diverse indigenous populations. Local native Yunnanese traders brought goods 
like metal wares and needles from lowland markets to remote villages and hills, playing 
the role of local middlemen.135  
The Yongzheng emperor’s expansion and consequent transformations brought by 
the large influx of immigrants since 1722 resulted in agrarian expansion and population 
growth. Before the 1750s, few towns had even 5,000 residents; most towns were the 
entrepôts distributed in rural regions and linked in commercial networks.136 James Lee 
estimates that the recovery of the southwest population from the Rebellion of the Three 
Feudatories in 1681 showed in the doubling of population numbers from 4 to 5 million in 
1700 to 11 million by 1775.137  
If agrarian expansion was the major driving force of population growth, 
participation in local markets encouraged the growth of frontier urbanization. Chinese 
immigrants supplied labor, capital, and organizational structures that built infrastructure 
and cities which contributed to the thriving of commercial, technical, clerical, and 
professional skills in the manufacturing sector.138 By cooperating with local Qing 
officials, government compounds (yamen 衙門) were constructed for officials and 
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barracks were built for hundreds of soldiers.139 Chen Hongmou’s civilizing project in 
Yunnan also drove the process of urbanization, centralization, and identity-formation 
through familiarizing local peoples with Chinese identity. The region experienced the 
development of the regional economy and urbanization, breaking the geographical 
barriers towards transregional integration. 
Integration of Local Trade into Transregional Trade 
The engagement of migrants stimulated a broad commercial revolution in the 
Yunnan-Southeast Asia borderland.140 The emergence of cities boosted the rise of an 
urban merchant class consisting of immigrant merchants. Immigrant merchants from the 
same original native place bonded through native place associations (huiguan會館), 
which also served in tasks like managing prices and businesses.141 Temples usually 
housed the native place associations. Inside the association temples, altars were set up for 
ancestral worship and for deities that should preserve the merchants’ ties with their native 
place.142 In addition, Chinese merchant organizations maintained commercial networks 
linking the southwest with the metropolitan areas in China and Southeast Asia. Merchant 
organizations organized the caravan routes, mobilized capital, cooperated in transregional 
trade with the Qing state, and developed new patterns of businesses to overcome trade 
challenges brought by topography and environment.143 
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To build their regional economic networks, Chinese merchants and Qing officials 
relied on the caravan trade to maintain long-distance trade networks between Yunnan and 
Southeast Asia. This Yunnan-Southeast Asia trade route was not new; it was well-known 
as the Silk Road of the Southwest. The major section of the route was the Sichuan-
Yunnan-Burma-India Road (chuan dian mian yin dao川滇緬印道). Merchants were able 
to trade commodities in the markets of China and South- and Southeast Asian countries. 
Communications between inland China and the southwest and its neighbors increased 
and stabilized especially after Yunnan was integrated as a province in 1276. The 
establishment of postal stations (yizhan驛站) along the roads by the Mongols served 
military communication and also encouraged trade and cultural communication. In the 
eighteenth century, the growth of the Sino-Southeast Asian trade largely relied on 
Yunnan-based routes and markets for exchanging a wide variety of products. 
Xishuangbanna connected southern Yunnan with Burma and Laos. In western Yunnan, a 
major trade center was Tengchong (騰衝), which connected western and northern 
Yunnan with the Shan States (撣邦)144 and Yangon (仰光).145 The caravans leaving 
Yunnan carried a variety of commodities, including cotton, tea, silk, manufactured 
 
144 The Shan States included ethnic minorities such as the Chin, the Kachin, the Lisu, and the 
Lahu. They were established after 1287 when the Pagan Kingdom fell to the Mongols. In 1885, 
the British captured Mandalay and thereafter the Shan States were ruled by the British crown 
until the Panglong Conference declared their independence in 1947.  
145 Yangon also known as Rangoon, is the largest city of Burma. The British colonialized Yangon 
and secured it as the commercial center of British Burma. Compared with other colonial-era cities 
in Southeast Asia like Bangkok in Thailand and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, the Yangon 
region is still not well-developed. Since independence, major anti-government protests in 1974, 
1988, 2007 and 2021 occurred in the city to bring about political change and a civil 
administration. 
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products and so forth. These commodities were traded in upland Southeast Asia and 
supplied domestic markets in Guizhou and Guangxi.  
The frequent tribute missions from mainland Southeast Asia facilitated different 
forms of material exchanges with the Qing empire. The Sino-Siamese commercial trade 
had flourished under the tributary system of China. For instance, in the eighteenth-
century Siamese kings and nobility ordered that their tribute envoys purchase and return 
with Chinese silk, Chinese-style stone sculptures, ceramics, and high-quality luxuries and 
ornamental items from the Qing empire.146 Most Sino-Southeast Asian trade was 
conducted through the maritime junk system that operated between Bangkok and 
Guangzhou; jade and gems were an exception.  
The Mongol invasion of Burma in the thirteenth century laid the foundation for 
the development of the Chinese fascination with jadeite (different from the nephrite 
called jade that was revered in China since the Neolithic) that continued ever since. 
China’s growing demand for gems and jade gave life to Burmese gem mining and 
export.147 In the Qing-Myanmar borderland cities Ruili (瑞麗) and Tengchong, muleteers 
carried the raw jade (yuanshi原石) to Yunnan from where it was shipped to the capital 
Beijing. Royal court painters designed the décor for jade carvings with landscapes, 
human figures, and animals, accompanied by skilled calligraphy engravings.148 Creative 
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design and the carvers’ high degree of skill are visible in the peak of craftmanship in the 
High Qing era. Jade consumption became a driving force in the Qing-Burmese trade, 
which mingled with the caravan trade. As the caravan trade developed from the 
eighteenth century, the Yunnanese caravans had permanent stations in northern Thailand. 
Although the merchants from Yunnan spoke different languages, dressed differently, and 
worshiped different deities, they were not considered foreigners in the Kachin Hills of 
Burma or in Chiang Mai in Thailand; instead, they played the role of mediators in the 
tribute relations between the Burmese, Siamese, and Chinese courts.149  
The old trading markets were integrated into large trade regions with the 
increased variety of commodities. Yunnan connected the Qing empire with the 
neighboring states in South and Southeast Asia. Imported and exported products shaped 
the history of material culture. Physical objects such as jade functioned as a strong tie to 
affirm the Sino-Burma commercial activities. Among categories of commodities, copper 
facilitated as a type of commodity as well as a source of taxes in the long-distance trade 
with Southeast Asia. 
Copper and Caravan Trade 
The rising attention to the mining of copper originated from the replacement of 
cowry money through cash during the Ming-Qing transition.150 The transformation of 
corvée services and taxes-in-kind into payments of silver brought tax silver to the central 
government of the Yuan and the Ming dynasty. But silver was not yet a major trade 
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currency, due to its weight and limited access in daily life and economic transfers. In both 
maritime and overland commodity trade with regions in Africa and Asia, cowry money 
served as the standard currency.151 Cowry money was circulated along the Southwest Silk 
Road and was used in India, Laos, Siam, and Burma. The usage of the shells of cowry 
snails as money originated in the Maldives and was exported to Bengal, Pegu152 and Siam 
via maritime trade. In the early sixteenth century, Portuguese merchants noticed the 
circulation of cowry money in the trade between South and Southeast Asia with the 
Maldives. When the Dutch dominated the Indian Ocean trade from the mid-seventeenth 
century, the Dutch East India Company imported cowries from the Maldives.  
Yet scholars still debate the sources of the cowry supply for Yunnan. Some 
believe that Chinese merchants and maritime vessels involved in the Southeast Asian 
cowry trade brought the cowry to Yunnan.153 However, others believe that the cowry 
could have been imported from Siam and Burma through overland trade. Although no 
concrete evidence supports either of these hypotheses, cowry money became the major 
currency in monetary transactions along the Southwest Silk Routes. In the Yunnan 
economy, cowries functioned as a medium of exchange and for loans, as a measure of 
payment for mortgages and retail, as a measure for the price of rice, and as a savings 
resource.154  
151 Hans Ulrich Vogel, “Cowry Trade and its Role in the Economy of Yunnan: From the Ninth to 
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36, no. 3 (1993): 211. 
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Cowry money began to collapse after the fourteenth century for two reasons. The 
first reason was related to bureaucratic management. In comparison to paper money and 
copper cash which were produced under the supervision of the government, the 
centralized monetary control did not work efficiently in the cowry trade because it was 
controlled by private and native hands.155 The second reason was that European 
imperialism and the expansion of the European world-system into the Indian Ocean trade 
networks disrupted the Maldives-Bengal maritime trade.156 Yunnan could no longer 
afford the booming price for cowries which had heated up due to the slave trade. More 
importantly, the Qing considered the replacement of cowry cash as a symbol of 
legitimating Chinese control over Yunnan and introducing Chinese culture and imperial 
rule to the southwest frontier region.157 Thus, the Ming and Qing governments both 
turned their attention to copper mining and constructed their monetary system in 
accordance with military interests and political intentions.  
From the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ming Ministry of Revenue 
made use of copper resources to supply the casting of copper cash. In 1576 and 1625, 
Dongchuan supplied copper for coinage in Jiangnan. In addition, copper became one of 
the major materials in architectural structures, such as Taihe Temple (Taihesi太和寺) in 
the Wudang Mountains (Wudangshan 武當山)  and the Golden Temple (Jindian 金殿) in 
the Jinma Mountains (Jinmashan 金馬山).158 Adequate copper resources supplied the 
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raw material for coinage, and copper cash eventually replaced the cowry system. The 
Ming dynasty taxed copper mining to supply the military with the revenue from mining 
taxes.  
In the late Ming and Qing periods, demand for copper increased due to the growth 
in maritime trade activities and Qing marketing campaigns. In 1682, Governor-General 
Cai Yurong (?-1699 蔡毓榮) initiated four steps to pay the military after the Revolt of the 
Three Feudatories: exploit the mines, cast coins, sell landlords’ estates, and reclaim land. 
The Qing government recruited civilians to extract copper form the mines and cast coins; 
the government collected 20% of the total extractions and merchants were allowed to buy 
and sell copper. Local officials who managed to collect more than 10,000 taels in taxes 
became eligible for a promotion; merchants and miners who paid ca. 3000-5000 taels in 
taxes could be awarded an official position. All these measures stimulated the 
development of the mining industry in Yunnan. The taxation of mining increased tenfold 
by 1706, reaching 81,428 taels.159 In 1723, the Yongzheng emperor modified the copper 
monopoly and allowed that miners could freely trade any copper surplus in addition to 
the quota delivered to the government. The new policy encouraged the development of 
the mining industry: the copper production increased from 100 million jin to 300 million 
jin by the year 1728.160  
In addition to establishing a public school system, Chen Hongmou understood the 
importance of copper circulation in Sino-Foreign trade. He adopted two approaches to 
was built in 1602. Due to the cancellation of bronze delivery to imperial’s capital the initial 
purpose of casting coinage was replaced by building a temple in Kunming.   
159 YNTS, vol. 4, 258-259. 
160 YNTS, vol. 4, 260. 
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meet the demand of money and stabilize the market price of copper. First, to solve the 
shortage of labor in the copper industry and to guarantee a fixed production quota, the 
news that individuals could keep the leftover copper from the smelting process attracted 
labors to work in newly established copper smelting facilities. Second, in order to secure 
the output from mines in the hand of the Qing empire, the copper quota that had to be 
sent to the Qing administration was increased and sold at a fixed price. Any surplus could 
be sold on the market for manufacturing purposes, such as kitchen utensils.161 Chen 
Hongmou’s economic thought and policy launched a thorough shift from command 
production to market driven state procurement, from payment at “official rates” (guanjia
官價) to payment at “people’s [market] rates” (minjia民價).162 By 1738, Yunnan had 
become the biggest supplier of copper coins to China’s metropolitan areas, preventing a 
shortage of coins in the trade between China, Europe, and Southeast Asia in the early 
modern period. The copper boom also reduced the demand for copper imports from 
Japan.  
To continue the copper mine extraction, a large number of Han immigrants, 
Muslims, and natives became miners and jointly worked together. Although the Qing 
government was in need of laborers in the coal mines, the empire remained cautious with 
regard to the mining industry and miners.163 In the eyes of rulers, the accumulation of 
local wealth was a potential threat, which might lead to the rise of a local power to 
compete with the imperial rule. Therefore, the imperial administration supervised the 
operation of copper mining and transportation, and the copper administration (tongzheng 
161 Rowe, Saving the World, 208. 
162 Rowe, Saving the World, 209.  
163 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 213. 
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銅政) managed all affairs related to copper manufacturing.164 Similar to the fear of losing 
control over Chinese and natives when allowing mixed marriages, the Qing government 
was concerned over the alliance between Chinese and non-Han miners. But neither the 
alliance nor the rebellions proved to be a real challenge to the Qing administration. The 
tension between Muslim and Han miners and merchants led to the Panthay Rebellion 
(1856-1873), which almost overthrew Qing control over Yunnan. The bloody rebellion 
caused a million deaths and worsened anti-Hui attitudes, which reshaped the relationship 
between ethnic communities with the Qing government.165 
The mining industry also created a visible transformation in the landscape. Two 
major mining complexes were located in Jinchai (金釵廠) and Gejiu (個舊). Old towns 
expanded their size and populations, and more towns emerged after the large influx of 
miners and merchants poured into these regions. The process of urbanization occurred in 
regions surrounding mines, bringing employment and commercial opportunities to local 
residents. But the mining operations resulted in a series of transformations of the 
landscape and of environmental conditions, including deforestation, loss of diversity, 
land erosion, and air pollution, among other relevant negative effects.  
Although environmental pollution became a potential threat for Yunnan, copper 
circulation witnessed the growth of the borderland economy and transregional commerce. 
In the fifteenth and sixteenth century, local traders transported local products and basic 
164 Yang, Between Winds and Clouds, 225. 
165 David G. Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in 
Southwest China, 1856-1873. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005): 188. The causes of the 
rebellion are still debated. Some scholars believe the rebellion started due to the conflicts over 
mining sources between Han and Hui; others argue the Chinese anti-Muslim attitude was the 
major cause. For more information, refer to Atwill’s book.  
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goods from lowland centers to upland remote regions, mostly limited to the Yun-Gui 
macro-regions and Southeast Asian highlands.166 The mountainous terrain and harsh 
natural landscape created physical barriers that compromised the commodity trade and 
market system in China’s southwest frontier which could not compare with the well-
functioning mercantile exchanges in the southern coastal and metropolitan regions. The 
caravan trade as a market structure can be characterized as a treelike system, which 
branched out from Kunming and Dali into more remote areas.167 At the early stage of 
long-distance trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Chinese silver flowed into 
Tengyue because merchants and the Ming government purchased rubies, amber, and jade 
in “Eight Gem Market” Street.168 By the mid-nineteenth century, following the influence 
of commercialization and the growth of market demands, Yunnan-based caravans 
traveled far and wide to destinations in the Western Corridors including Bhamo, Katha, 
and the Bawdwin Mine, and to Southern Corridor markets including Kengtung and 
Chiangmai in Burma and Siam respectively.169 Han Chinese never replaced native traders 
and merchants in the caravan teams, but high-ranking Yunnan officials and Chinese 
merchants owned and dominated the so-called “mule teams” and “horse gangs” (mabang 
 
166 Skinner identified nine macro-regions—Lingnan, Upper Yangtze, Middle Yangtze, Lower 
Yangtze, Northwest China, North China, Yun-Guizhou, Southeast Coast, and Manchuria—as the 
natural market regions of the major cities in the nineteenth century. His concept comprised 
marketing hierarchies, represented by the flow of commodities from the periphery to major cities. 
The most populated cities in China were located near advanced and convenient water 
transportation systems on rivers. Therefore, the Yun-Gui plateau (yungui gaoyuan 雲貴高原) had 
its obvious drawback in its riverine system and mountainous terrain. For details about the concept 
of “physiographic macro-regions,” see G. William Skinner’s essay “Regional Urbanization in 
nineteenth-century China,” in The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1977): 211-49. 
167 Hill, Merchants and Migrants, 35.  
168 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 169. 
169 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 170. 
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馬幫). The caravan trade continued to thrive from the late nineteenth century to the early 
twentieth century.  
Cotton was another major and most profitable commodity that the horse gangs 
transported. Although Yunnan did not cultivate cotton, the region’s advanced textile 
industry not only produced quality clothes and textile artifacts but also dyed colorful 
cloth.170 Chinese traders bought raw cotton and cloth from highland areas surrounding 
Kengtung, and caravans went to Luang Prabang to purchase cotton.171 In the cotton 
business, the Yunnanese caravans imported raw cotton from Burma and transported 
Chinese silk, finished dyed clothes, and porcelain to Burma; in return local textile 
products and cotton were transported to China.  
Another commodity that played roles in the caravan trade was the Pu’er tea, 
which began as early as the Tang dynasty when tea was exchanged for Tibetan horses, 
but the trade reached its peak after the Qing military and immigrants arrived and settled 
in Yunnan. At the early age of the tea trade, peddlers carried goods like tea and salt on 
their backs, until later the caravan teams were organized. In the eighteenth century, tea 
trade routes reached Beijing and the empire’s major cities, as well as Tibet, India, 
Southeast Asia, and in some cases, Eurasia. Pu’er tea was brought as tribute to Beijing. 
Domestic consumption concentrated in Chengdu. Departing from Xishuangbanna, 
Yunnanese muleteers and animals carried tea to Xiaguan (下關), from where it was 
transported to Lijiang (麗江), Tengchong, and Burma. When the caravan team reached 
Yangon, Burma, they sent tea to Tibet through the northern overland route and to India 
170 YNTS, vol. 4, 268. 
171 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 172-3. 
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by sea. The maritime trade then transported tea to India, from where it was distributed to 
European countries. Therefore, Kolkata had gradually become a transit market for tea 
destined for the world market.172  
Conclusion 
As Chinese migrants settled down in the region, a process of changes led to 
political, economic, and cultural transformations that assimilated indigenous communities 
into becoming “Chinese” and integrated Yunnan even more into the long-distance trade 
with the Southeast Asian borderlands. Those transformations built a new Yunnan, 
connecting the province to the Qing realm. Yunnan’s caravan trade and merchants 
became the “middle section” of the trade that connected the Qing with South and 
Southeast Asia. Chinese merchants played active roles in reshaping a commercialized 
Yunnan. Ethnic minorities also participated in the development of Yunnan’s economy. 
Their resettlements and constant interaction with Burmese and Siamese partners reflected 
both their close relationships with Southeast Asia and their acceptance of having become 
Chinese. 
In the process of economic development, a large number of natives and Han 
settlers incorporated to meet the state’s interests. In copper mining industry, ethnic 
tensions might be visible. But this visible tension also reflected how the natives and Han 
settlers managed to accommodate one another. The exploitation of the mines and the 
copper production caused significant environmental pollution and changes to the 
landscape. Unfortunately, today there are few if any accounts of the ecological conditions 
172 YNTS, vol. 4, 269. 
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in the copper mining era that would allow us to assess how the landscape changed from 




The transformation of Yunnan in Chinese history was dynamic and complex. 
Located in the borderland region adjacent to Southeast Asia, Yunnan was and still is 
exposed to multiple cultures and political centers. Even though the region’s strategic 
location and valuable resources attracted the imperial expansion, none of China’s 
imperial dynasties could fully transform Yunnan into a conventional Han-dominated 
province. For more than a millennium prior to the creation of Yunnan Province during 
the Mongol Yuan dynasty, Yunnan functioned as a “frontier” region where the 
indigenous population encountered various cultural influences and invasions from rulers 
who were inspired by the values and concepts of Confucian orthodoxy and regarded the 
indigenous locals as inferior. This “Chinese-barbarian binary” and the related “center-
local dichotomy” cast a shadow over the truth that the centralized government did not 
unify Yunnan. This was especially true at the height of the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, 
whose cultural values, transnational relations and military forces rivaled those of the 
Tang and the Song dynasties. It was only during the Mongol conquest of Dali that 
Yunnan’s native leaders and local elites received imperial recognition. The invention of 
the name Yunnan served the purpose of governing the local population under a 
centralized rule. 
To govern the multiethnic territory of Yunnan the Yuan dynasty granted local 
chieftains the title tusi and allowed them to continue to rule over the local population. 
This indirect influence of the Yuan enhanced the imperial rule in indigenous frontier 
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societies. The accomplishments of the Yuan paved the way for the Ming and Qing 
dynasties to set up an administration that began to civilize the local “barbarians” and to 
choose their methods to incorporate permanently the distant reaches of the empire. The 
Ming government inherited the native chieftain system, but they expanded their direct 
rule. In doing so, the Ming established administrative institutions in the province and 
encouraged immigrants to introduce Chinese culture to and to exploit the natural 
resources of their new homeland. A growing number of immigrants relocated to the 
upland regions that were previously isolated.  
The Qing expansion to Yunnan represented a turning point in policies towards an 
amalgamation of cultures for the purpose of incorporating and dominating the region. 
Upon the Han immigrants’ arrival in Yunnan, their population grew markedly, fueling the 
demand for valuable resources, arable land, and trade opportunities. Agrarian expansion 
facilitated urbanization and population growth, stimulating the development of the 
borderland economy. The exploitation of copper in Yunnan not only supplied copper for 
the Sino-Foreign trade but also connected Yunnan to Southeast Asian maritime and 
caravan trade. A wide range of commodities, such as cotton, tea, and jade, integrated 
Yunnan into a long-distance transregional trade. Together these transformations shaped 
Yunnan into the “intermediary region” linking China with Southeast Asia and Eurasia.  
All transformations described above occurred after the Yongzheng emperor 
replaced the native chieftain system with appointed Qing officials who governed Yunnan. 
The rationale of initiating the gaitu guiliu policy indicated the Qing empire’s demands in 
the expansion phase. Although military suppression also expanded imperial influences on 
the far southwest, the Qing frontier policy would not have been efficient without the help 
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of the local population due to the enormous natural and cultural barriers. Since the 
emergence of the Manchu, rulers had never been able to identify with non-Chinese 
peoples. Therefore, they chose to combine Chinese and non-Chinese institutional 
structures, a step that ultimately proved to be useful and effective in governing the new 
frontier region. 
State-sponsored ‘civilizing’ projects aimed to indoctrinate the indigenous 
population with Han culture and make them into subjects to the Qing empire. The 
triumph of Chen Hongmou’s civilization mission was embodied in the rise of educated 
groups who actively participated in facilitating the new Han-style social order in Yunnan. 
Yet the establishment of Qing authority over Yunnan was accompanied by 
accommodating indigenous communities and their customs. Yunnan had never been 
entirely Sinicized or assimilated by Han-Chinese civilization. Maybe the indigenous 
people resisted the transformation because they sensed that conforming their way of life 
to the occupying power’s demands could endanger their distinctiveness.  
Even the misunderstanding of and ignorance about Yunnan are the result of a 
geography and cultural diversity that repeatedly confounded the emperors, and thus the 
dynamic course of historical change was less defined by Han Chinese than by the 
participation in reforms by the local population itself. The ignorance about the history of 
the ethnic minority springs from their very categorization as minorities. In the case of 
imperial Yunnan, scholars have described the region as a backward frontier which was 
occupied by immature, uncivilized, wild, and savage ethnic minorities. After the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Yunnanese were no longer 
labeled as savages; rather, their definition as an ‘ethnic minority’ in the new state 
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distinguished them from the Han majority. Though they may very well constitute the 
majority in their home districts, they are a minority within China in statistical terms, and 
thus the new label reinforced the dominance of the Han Chinese which in conjunction 
with historians’ depictions of Yunnan as a ‘frontier’ obscures the indigenous population’s 
capability of having resisted the dominance of the imperial dynasties of the past.  
In the introduction, I discussed how the terms “frontier” and “borderland” overlap 
and are entangle in the label of bianjiang. Due to the lack of a precise definition for each 
term, scholars of Chinese history apply Western frameworks in the study of Yunnan. 
Although neither term is sufficient to encase the historical particularity of China’s 
southwest, frontier-borderland studies have helped to illustrate the specific experiences 
and influences of interethnic trade in early modern Yunnan, providing historians with a 
more nuanced framework for the study of historical change and continuity in 
southwestern China. 
The original interpretation of Sinicization involved two major groups: the Han 
Chinese who represented Han culture and its presumed superiority, and the Manchus who 
cultivated their own ethnic identity and culture. The conventional historical narratives of 
Sinicization and assimilation were generated by overemphasizing a cultural supremacy of 
the Han majority in transforming both the native populations and the military invaders, 
who belonged to an ethnic minority compared to the Han. These narratives disregard 
relations between the ruling class and the dominated subjects. Influenced by this deep-
rooted framework, historians often overemphasized the assimilating force of Chinese 
civilization in transforming the empire’s southwestern periphery and its native 
inhabitants. It implicitly argues that the frontier policy adopted by emperor Yongzheng 
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and his officials consisted of the integration of Chinese culture and administrative 
institutions, thus spreading the influence of Chinese civilization rather than Manchu 
supremacy. But the reality is that the militarization of Yunnan and the relocation of Han 
Chinese immigrants to Yunnan determined the success of enforcing the power of the 
state. The Han brought their beliefs and customs along during their resettlement, serving 
the empire’s purpose to consolidate the region. I argue that the significant contributions 
made by the Han immigrants in the southwest did not reduce the importance of the native 
people. Instead of becoming Sinicized they were able to maintain and preserve the variety 
and diversity in culture and ethnicity through their contact with upland Southeast Asian 
communities, in spite of the intense attempts to assimilate them by the Qing government.  
My research has shown that Yunnan was never a well-developed province of 
China. Though the Ming and Qing integration made the region part of the state, it 
temporarily but not sustainably accelerated the regional development. Only in recent 
years has the province’s cultural diversity become a major attraction for tourists. Tourism 
has brought revenue and job opportunities for Yunnan’s neglected economic 
development. Ethno-tourism presents marginal ethnic cultures and pristine landscapes to 
visitors. Minorities who were cut off from China’s economic boom in the past decades 
due to the remote locations of their residential regions take advantage of the tourism that 
has reached their homes and manufacture handicrafts as a seasonal source of income.  
Xi Jinping’s new foreign policy program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
outlines a vision of increased Eurasian economic integration. The main components of 
the BRI are to invest in the construction of infrastructure, transportation, and 
communication projects in Central and Southeast Asia. BRI economic corridors reach 
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different regions with a variety of projects. For instance, the China-Indochina Peninsula 
Economic Corridor program covers Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam and aims to 
extend the newly built Baoshan-Tengchong highway to Myitkyina, the capital of 
Myanmar’s Kachin state.  
Although the strategic role Yunnan played historically has lasted from ancient 
times to the present-day, the development opportunities and the incomes of its multi-
ethnic residents to this day lag behind their neighbors in other areas. The question of why 
Yunnan’s development level still trails behind compared to other provinces remains 
unanswered. Is Yunnan’s future still confined by the limited vision of those in power, 
who want to collect their profits while bypassing the local population? When will 
Yunnan receive the attention it deserves by scholars and policy makers who jointly 
develop a vision for a future in which Yunnan’s unique resources are used in a 
sustainable way that enhances economic opportunities for its multiethnic local residents? 
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY 
Sima Qian司馬遷 Southwestern Barbarians西南夷 
Xishuangbanna西雙版納  Water Splashing Festival潑水節 
Dai 傣  bazi垻子 
Dian滇 Cuan爨 
Nanzhao Kingdom南詔國   Changhe State長和国 
Dali Kingdom大理國 Yunnan Temporary Province 雲南省
tusi 土司 tuguan土官 
Eight Banners八旗  Shanhai Pass山海關 
Wu Sangui吳三桂  Gao Qizhuo高其倬  
Li Wei李衛  salt intendent 鹽驛道 
E’ertai 鄂爾泰 gaitu guiliu改土歸流 
grain intendant糧驛道 Chen Hongmou陳宏謀 
gaizi街子 postal stations驛站  
Silk Road of the Southwest西南絲綢之路 Ancient Tea Horse Road茶馬古道
horse gang馬幫  Pu’er tea普洱茶 
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APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS 
QSG Qing Shi Gao 清史稿 (Draft for a History of the Qing). Compiled and 
written by a team of historians led by Zhao Erxun. Zhonghua Publishing 
House, 1998.  
YNTZ Yunnan Tongzhi 雲南通志 (Yunnan Gazetteer). Written by E’ertai. 
Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2007. 
YNTS Yunnan Tongshi 雲南通史 (The General History of Yunnan). Compiled 
by He Yaohua. Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2011.  
GZDYZ Gongzhongdan Yongzheng chao zouzhe 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺 (Secret 
Palace Memorials of the Yung-Cheng period). Compiled by the National 
Palace Museum, 32 volumes. Taipei: National Palace Museum Press, 
1977-1980.  
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APPENDIX C: IMPERIAL DYNASTIES 
Qin 221-206 B.C.E
Western (Former) Han 106 B.C.E-8 C.E 
Eastern (Later) Han  23-220
Three Kingdom (Wei, Shu, Wu) 220-280
Jin 265-317




Northern Song  960-1127





APPENDIX D: EMPERORS OF THE QING DYNASTY 
Years of Reign  Personal Name Reign Title 
1636-1643 Hong Taiji皇太極 Tiancong天聰 
1644-1661 Fulin福臨  Shunzhi順治 
1661-1722 Xuanye玄燁  Kangxi康熙 
1722-1735 Yinzhen胤禛  Yongzheng雍正 
1736-1796 Hongli弘歷  Qianlong乾隆 
1796-1820 Yongyan永琰  Jiaqing嘉慶 
1820-1850 Minning旻寧  Daoguang道光 
1850-1861 Yizhu奕詝  Xianfeng咸豐 
1861-1875 Zaichun載淳  Tongzhi同治  
1875-1908 Zaitian 載湉  Guangxu光緒  
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